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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Joinder of Resident Agent to Defeat Federal
Jurisdiction-Tort Liability of Agent
A power company and three of its employees were sued as joint
tortfeasors. It was alleged that lack of proper supervision and inspec-
tion on the part of all defendants caused a pole carrying power lines
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to fall with a resultant injury to the plaintiff. The power company was
a non-resident of the state in which the action was brought and
would have been entitled to removal to a federal court on the ground
of diversity of citizenship if the employees, who were residents, had
not been joined. On the theory that the employees were fraudulently
joined, the power company removed the cause. The District Court,
in considering a motion by the plaintiff to remand to the state court,
held that the employees were not properly joined because they owed
no duty to the plaintiff to inspect the pole and further, that if guilty, it
was of nonfeasance rather than misfeasance. The distinction is that an
employee may be liable to a third person for misfeasance but not for
nonfeasance.1
The effect of cases in which the liability of an agent (or servant) 2
is involved has been obscured by an economic reality, a procedural pe-
culiarity, and a verbal nonsensicality.
Economically a judgment against an agent is in most cases inef-
fective. Consequently suit is usually- against the principal alone under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. -An appeal from such a suit does
not involve the agent's liability. If the principal and agent are sued
jointly the agent will seldom appeal since a judgment does not bother
him so long as there is no attempt to enforce it. As a result the su-
preme courts seldom have an opportunity to discuss an agent's liability.
A procedural question motivates the majority of cases involving
the employee's liability. The plaintiff joins the resident employee as
a joint tortfeasor with his non-resident employer for the obvious pur-
pose of preventing removal to a federal court. 3 If the employer thinks
no cause of action against the employee exists he files a petition for
removal in which he states the facts supporting his contention. On
appeal from a ruling on this petition to the state supreme court these
facts are deemed to be true and the court decides as a matter of law
if a cause of action has been stated against the employee. If there is,
of course, removal is denied. If there is not it is fraudulent joinder
and the non-resident defendant is entitled to-removal. 4 In the federal
court the plaintiff may file a motion to remand to the state court. The
court must then pass on the employee's liability and in doing so follow
the law of the state in which the action originated.5 Ostensibly it ap-
pears that the federal court is being asked to reach an opposite result,
'Norwood v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 74 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
7 LABATT. MASTER AND SERVANT §2585 (2d ed. 1913) (no distinction be-
tween liability of an agent or a servant).
'Chicago, R. I., and Pacific Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184 (1912) (motive
for joinder is immaterial so long as a cause of action against the employee is
stated).
I McINTosn, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE §§287-289 (1929);
Crisp v. Champion Fibre Co., 193 N.C. 78, 136 S.E. 238 (1927).
'Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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on the same set of facts, from that of the court whose law it is bound
to follow. The federal court, however, is not restricted to the facts
as alleged in the petition but determines the actual facts.6 If there is
a disparity then there is a new situation which must be passed on as
a matter of state law. As stated before, the great majority of cases in
the state court which involve the question are those ruling on the pe-
tition for removal and unfortunately most of these are summarily dis-
missed with "the facts stated in the petition are (are not) sufficient to
justify removal."'7 It would seem that more state decisions, even by way
of dictum, which declared the status of the law in that state would be
of great aid to parties seeking removal in determining what facts to in-
clude in their petition and to the federal courts in determining the law
which they are bound to follow.
The verbal handicap in this field has arisen out of an attempt to
determine liability by use of the expression of misfeasance or non-
feasance. The rule was that an agent is liable in tort to a third person
for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance. 8 Varied interpretations have
been given this rule: (1) The strict interpretation that for affirmative
acts (misfeasance) there is liability but for failure to act (nonfeasance)
there is no liability.9 The absurdity of this is that an agent would never
be liable for negligence which, by its very definition, is not doing what
should have been done. 10 (2) Acts of omission or commission which
breach a duty owed to a third person (misfeasance) impose liability,
but omission of an act which breaches a duty owed solely to the prin-
cipal (nonfeasance) imposes no liability on the agent to the third per-
son.11 This interpretation, in reality, destroys the rule since it makes
duty, as in all tort cases, the determining factor. The majority of courts
today recognize the duty relation as controlling, either by adopting the
second interpretation or by discarding the misfeasance-nonfeasance rule
altogether.12 It is remarkable that these two words have survived as
long as they have. 13
8 Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 (1913).
"Kerley v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.C. 465, 31 S.E. 2d 438 (1944).8 Burch v. Caden Stone Co., 93 Fed. 181 (CC. Ky. 1899) ; Drake v. Hagan,
108 Tenn. 265, 67 S.W. 470 (1902); Mitchell v. Durham, 13 N.C. 538 (1828).
'Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140, 78 Atl 725 (1910).1
* Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N.C. 649, 654, 130 S.E. 638, 640
(1925).1 Murray v. Cowherd, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S.W. 6 (1912) ; Morey v. Shenango
Furnace Co., 112 Minn. 528, 127 N.W. 1134 (1910).
"
2Edwards v. Southern Ry., 212 N.C. 61, 65, 192 S.E. 855, 858 (1937) ("The
omission of an employee . . . to perform a legal duty owed to a third person
ordinarily imposes liability on both employee and employer."); Clevenger v.
Grover, 211 N.C. 240, 189 S.E. 782 (1937); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Southern Ry., 209 N.C. 304, 183 S.E. 620 (1935); McCourtie v. Bayton, 159
Wash. 418, 294 Pac. 238 (1930) (there is "no distinction as regards the agent's
liability, whether the injuries flow from his nonfeasance or misfeasance.").
"3 See Note, 28 L.R.A. 433 (1895) (misfeasance-nonfeasance rule has from
its origin been based on a misconception).
[Vol. 26
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The question remains; when and to whom does an agent owe duties?
This may be resolved into three categories:
(1) Duties imposed on the agent as a responsible individual, in
common with all other members of society.-'
(2) Statutory duties regulating the particular phase of work in
which the agent is employed. The fact that one is an agent does not
excuse a noncompliance with these statutes.15
(3) Duties to third persons which the contract of employment im-
poses on the agent. A hypothetical case illustrates the problem in-
volved. P (principal) owes T (third party) the duty of performing
act X. P employs A (agent) to perform act X. A does nothing and
as a result of act X not being performed T is injured. Two actions are
obvious. T against P in tort or contract, and P against A for
breach of contract. Is there an action by T against A? Some courts
have said not because there is no privity.16 This may rule out a con-
tract action but it would not affect an action in tort. Other courts have
called this nonfeasance for which there is no liability.17 Still others have
said that the duty is owed solely to the principal, obviously meaning
a contractual duty, and refuse to mention a possible tort liability to
T.18 A step toward imposing a duty in such cases was taken by the
decisions which hold that if A once begins performing act X, and
then stops, any resultant injury will expose him to liability.' 9 A similar
tendency is shown in the cases holding agents in charge of property to
a peculiar responsibility to perform all acts for which they contract in
regard to the property.20 The final step in the process will be to hold
an agent liable in all cases for the natural and probable consequences
of a failure to perform the acts which his employment contemplates. 2 '
Although the law has been thus extended where an independent
contractor is involved,2 2 no cases in the field of agency have yet adopted
such a rule. It is suggested as the logical result. It would be in line
with an increased recognition of. the social responsibility undertaken
by a contracting party towards those who rely on his performance.
HOYT PATRICK TAYLOR, JR.
", Cases in this category consist largely of the misperformance of acts which
there is a perfect right to perform in a proper way. See Alpha Mills v. Water-
town Steam Engine Co., 116 N.C. 797, 21 S.E. 917 (1895).
" Illinois C.R.R. v. Archer, 113 Miss. 158, 74 So. 135 (1916) ; Patry v. North-
ern P.R.., 114 Minn. 375, 131 N.W. 462 (1911).
"Delaney v. Rocherau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882) ("For nonfeasance the
responsibility must arise from some express or implied obligation between parties
standing in privity of law or contract with each other.").
' Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 167 S.E. 119 (1932).
08 Olsness v. State, 58 N.D. 20, 224 NW. 913 (1929).
Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102 (1881) ; Orcutt v. Century Building Co.,
201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1907).
" Drake v. Hagan, 108 Tenn. 265, 67 S.W. 470 (1902) ; Lough v. John Davis
& Co., 30 Wash. 204, 70 Pac. 491 (1902).21PROSSER, TORTS §§206-210 (1941).
"Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N.C. 375, 38 S.E. 912 (1901).
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Bankruptcy-Turnover Order as Res Judicata in Contempt
Proceedings-Limiting the Rule in Oriel v. Russell
In granting the petition for a turnover order by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' held that possession at
the time of adjudication of bankruptcy, or before or after such adjudica-
tion, gave rise to a presumption of continuing possession at the time
of the request for a turnover order.2 In contempt proceedings brought
for failure to obey the turnover order, the bankrupt persistently claimed
inability to comply with the order and claimed that he did not have
possession of the property at the time of issuance of the order. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals,3 admitting the facts indicated that he
was actually unable to comply with the order, nevertheless affirmed
the holding of the district court that the bankrupt be jailed until
he complied. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,4 the
judgment was vacated and it was held that the controlling factor in
the contempt proceedings was the issue of the present ability of the
bankrupt to comply with the turnover order, and that the decision in
Oriel v. Russell 5 did not compel the court to commit the bankrupt for
contempt despite the presence of a belief of inability to comply.
The case of Oriel v. Russell establishes the rule that in contempt
proceedings where the purpose of the proceedings is not to punish the
bankrupt for refusal to obey the order but rather to aid as a part of
the bankruptcy procedure in coercing the bankrupt to produce assets
which have been judicially determined to be in his possession in the
proceedings for the turnover order,6 the decision of the court in issuing
the turnover order is res judicata and cannot be attacked collaterally.7
Reaffirming this holding, the majority of the court in the instant case
says, "But application of that rule in these civil contempt cases means
only that the bankrupt, confronted by the order establishing prior pos-
session, at a time when continuance thereof is the reasonable inference,
is thereby confronted by a prima facie case which he can successfully
1 Zeitz v. Maggio, 145 F. 2d 241 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 841
(1945).
' The second circuit applies this -presumption with almost conclusive effect.
Cohen v. Jeskowitz, 144 F. 2d 39 (C.C.A. 2d 1944) ; Robbins v. Gottbetter, 134
F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 2d 1943); Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F. 2d 977 (C.C.A. 2d
1942).5In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., 157 F. 2d 951 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
'Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401 (1948).
r278 U.S. 358 (1929).
052 STAr. 843 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §11(a) (13) (1940) ; 52 STAT. 859-860 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §69 (1940) ; In re MacNaught, 225 Fed. 511 (Mass. 1903) (the power
to commit is used to compel obedience, not punish for disobedience).
Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929) ; cf. In re Free and Flinck, Inc., 18 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. N.Y. 1937) (newly discovered evidence). Contra: In re Elias, 240
Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917) (Many cases before the decision in Oriel v. Russell held
that evidence of happenings before or after the issuance of the turnover order
could be considered in the contempt proceedings.).
[Vol: 26
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meet only with a showing of present inability to comply. He cannot
challenge the previous adjudication of possession, but that does not pre-
vent him from establishing lack of present possession." 8 Any evidence
that the bankrupt may give which satisfies the court that he does not
presently have possession of the property, and cannot comply with the
order, is sufficient.9
It must be kept in mind that this is a civil contempt' 0 which is not
for the purpose of punishment for concealment of assets but rather
for use in coercing the bankrupt to turn over assets when it appears
that no other sanction is accomplishing this. It can hardly be denied
that the conclusion of the court in the instant case is just and proper
because if it is proven to the court's satisfaction that the bankrupt does
not have possession of the goods, there can be no purpose in imprison-
ment to coerce him into giving up that which he does not have. The
dissent, affirming the decision of the circuit court of appeals, would in
effect commit the bankrupt fruitlessly as the court must release him im-
mediately since it already is satisfied that he cannot comply with the
order.
There are two important considerations the court must note in laying
down the law applicable to this contempt proceeding. First, there is
the desire to aid the trustee in his administration of the bankrupt estate
and to prevent the bankrupt from escaping his duties under the law
because of a weak weapon in the hands of that law. 11 Second, there is
the feeling that the bankrupt should not be imprisoned unless the
court is reasonably certain that in so doing its purpose will be effected-
to put him into jail otherwise would be punishment for debt rather than
an instrument of coercion.' 2 The bankruptcy act provides specifically
for an action by the trustee against the bankrupt for fraudulent con-
' Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401, 411 (1948).
'Toplitz v. Walser, 27 F. 2d 196 (C.C.A. 3d 1928) (bankrupt sufficiently
answers the inquiry as to the property previously adjudged in his possession hming
passed out of his control by convincing the court that he is physically unable to
obey the order). See Kreitman, The Presumption of Continued or Present Pos-
session in Turnover Proceedings, A3 CoRn. REORG. AND Am. BANKR. RE . 326(1940).
"'ee Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
".See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 363 (1929) (the contempt proceedings
are intended to compel, against the reluctance of the bankrupt, performance by
him of his lawful duty). In California the trustee in bankruptcy may obtaifn a
money judgment in the state court against the bankrupt in case the contempt
proceedings are unavailing because of absence of proof by the trustee of his
ability to comply with the order. Sampsell v. Gittelman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 292,
130 P. 2d 486 (1942), A5 Corn,. REORG. AND Am. BANxR. Ray. 35.
" In re Heppellee, 2 F. Supp. 663 (Mass. 1932) (contempt is not a substitute
for imprisonment for debt) ; In re MacNaught, 225 Fed. 511 (Mass. 1903). It
is now settled that punishment for contempt for disobedience of the turnover order
is not imprisonment for debt since the bankrupt does not owe the property but
rather is obliged to turn over that which has been placed in the custody of the
trustee in bankruptcy for distribution to the creditors pursuant to the provisions of
the bankruptcy law. 5 REmixoN, BANKRUPTCY §2410 (4th ed. 1936).
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cealment of assets'3 and this civil contempt must not be confused
with that nor used in its place. But between the two considerations
there must be some rule of law which will in some measure effect both.
The generally accepted rule of evidence in contempt proceedings
for disobedience of the turnover order is the same as is necessary for
the issuance of the order itself, namely; that it be "clear and convinc-
ing"'14 that the bankrupt can comply with the turnover order. Then,
if he refuses to do so, he may be put into prison until such time as the
court is satisfied that he is not able to comply.' 5 The length of time
he will be kept in prison will depend on the amount and type of proper-
ty involved, the surrounding circumstances, and the discretion of the
court. But this discretion as to the length of imprisonment must not be
abused and the-imprisonment must be no longer than necessary for the
court to satisfy itself that the bankrupt cannot comply with the order.' 6
In holding that the evidence for commitment for contempt must be
beyond a reasonable doubt,17 the concurring opinion is concerned solely
with the desire to keep from committing the bankrupt to imprisonment
unless the court is positive that he is able to comply with the order.
This, of course, in requiring a different rule of evidence for commit-
ment for contempt from that necessary to the issuance of the turnover
order, rebuts any notion that the turnover order cannot be attacked
collaterally in the contempt proceedings' 8 and can only result in dis-
sipating the bankruptcy law because under this rule the bankrupt can,
by injecting any element of doubt in the mind of the court, escape
the coercive arm of the law. It is true that imprisonment is a heavy
weapon, but when all else has failed, it is one that must be resorted to
in order that the bankrupt not be allowed to escape from his moral and
1352 STAT. 855-856 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §52(b) (1940).
14 "With reference to the character or degree of proof in establishing a civil
fraud, the authorities are quite clear that it need not be beyond a reasonable
doubt, because it is a civil proceeding. . . . We think it would be going too far
to adopt the severer rule of criminal cases and would render the bankruptcy
system less effective." Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 364, 365 (1929).
"In re Roxy Liquor Corp., 107 F. 2d 533 (C.C.A. 7th 1939) (the bankrupt
has the legal power to end his confinement by turning over the property and the
assumption is he would do this if able rather than endure a prolonged confinement).
" "Where it [commitment] has failed, and when a reasonable interval of
time has supplied the previous defects in the evidence, and has made sufficiently
certain what was doubtful before, namely the bankrupt's inability to obey the
order, he has always been released, . Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 366(1929).
" Before Oriel v. Russell, there was a split in authority as to whether the
proof had to be beyond a reasonable doubt or a mere preponderance. In re Elias,
240 Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917) (a mere preponderance); Stuart v. Reynolds,
204 Fed. 709 (C.C.A. 5th 1913) (beyond a reasonable doubt) ; In re Adler, 170
Fed. 634 (E.D. Okla. 1908) (beyond a reasonable doubt); Moody v. Cole, 148
Fed. 295 (Me. 1906) (beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Switzer, 140 Fed. 976(S.C. 1905) (beyond a reasonable doubt) ; See In re Felson, 124 Fed. 288, 289(N.D. N.Y. 1903) (a mere preponderance). See also 5 RzmrNoGroN, BANKRUPTCY
§2411 (4th ed. 1936).
" But see Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929).
[Vol. 26
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legal duty, that of providing his assets for the satisfaction of creditors. 19
He is given the advantage of being able to start life anew once the
bankruptcy proceedings are completed, and is only fair that he submit
to the powers of the court which only wants him to do his part.
The dissent would have the evidence confined in all cases to the
showing of events since the turnover order making it impossible for
the bankrupt to comply,20 and would make it incumbent upon the bank-
rupt to produce this evidence or else be adjudged in contempt without
regard to any other factors. If this be so, then we have the very situa-
tion as in the instant case where the court admits the inability to comply
with a turnover order issued by it, and yet because of precedent from
which the court cannot extricate itself,21 it commits the bankrupt for
contempt. Holding that the bankrupt, in order to escape imprisonment
for contempt, must show something happening since the issuance of
the turnover order 22 puts him into a difficult position, to say the least.
The issues in both the petition for the turnover order and the con-
tempt proceedings are present possession of the property, but possession
as of different dates. The issuance of the turnover order determines
the property to be in the possession of the bankrupt on the date of the
order, but the court must be convinced that the bankrupt still has the
property or its proceeds in his custody at the time of the contempt pro-
ceedings before it can properly commit him to jail for disobedience of
the order. As for the evidence necessary on the part of the bankrupt to
prove nonpossession at the time of the contempt proceedings, the court
says in the instant case: "Of course we do not attempt to lay down a
comprehensive or detailed set of rules on this subject. They will have
to be formulated as specific and concrete cases present different aspects
of the problem." 28
The Supreme Court in the instant case neither discards the rule of
the Oriel case as it pertains to the res judicata24 effect of the turnover
order nor reverts to the holdings of many cases before Oriel v. Rus-
5 RxmiNGroN, BANKRUPrCY §2410 (4th ed. 1936).
"
0Justice Frankfurter delivered the dissent.
" The second circuit has six circuit judges who never -sit en banc and pre-
sumably deem it undesirable for the majority of one panel to have a different
view from that of another panel.
" In re Kasimov, 81 F. 2d 531 (C.C.A. 6th 1936); Sarkes v. Wells, 37 F.
2d 339 (C.C.A. 6th 1930); In re Siegler, 31 F. 2d .972 (C.C.A. 2d 1929). See
Kreitman, The Presumption of Continued or Present Possession in Turwver Pro-
ceedings, .A3 CoRP. REORG. AND Am. BANmi. Rnv. 325, 326 (1940). See also
McGovern, Aspects of the Turnover Proceedings in Bankruptcy, 9 FoRD. L. RFv.
316 (1940).
"
3Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 Sup. Ct. 401, 411 (1948).2 For application of the doctrine of res judicata there must be (1) identity
of the thing, (2) identity of the cause, 'and (3) identity of the parties in the
character in which they are litigant. W. A. and G. Packet Co. v. Sickels, 65
U. S. 242 (1860).
19481
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sell2 5 to the effect that the issuance of the turnover order has no proba-
tive value in the contempt proceedings. But it is held that the turn-
over order, once established by the trustee in bankruptcy, puts the
burden upon the bankrupt to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
he is physically unable to comply with that order.26 He cannot at-
tack the validity of the turnover order, but he can meet the burden
imposed upon him by the issuance of that order with evidence showing
that he is not now in possession of the property and thus incapable of
complying. The bankrupt is not bound to the showing of happenings
since the issuance of the order making him unable to comply, in order to
escape imprisonment, unless the court issuing the turnover order fol-
lowed the rule of the Oriel case that the evidence should be "dear and
convincing" 27 before the order can issue, and in the majority of cases
the courts will have adhered to that rule. However, when the order
upon its face indicates that the court did not issue it upon "clear and
convincing" evidence, but rather because of an inflexible rule of law
which they feel constrained to follow because of precedent,28 the Su-
preme Court cannot justifiably continue the unreasonable presumption
that the bankrupt has in his possession the goods and can comply
with the order when such is obviously not the fact. This was not the
intent of the Oriel case but would be rather a perversion of the rule
there established, which rule must be applied by the court only when
the circumstances warrant.2 9
DANIEL D. RancwrN.
Discovery-Inspection of Chattels
In a recent case,1 the plaintiff sued a bottling company for damages
for an illness allegedly resulting from the consumption of part of a
bottled drink containing a deleterious substance. Before trial, the
defendant requested that the plaintiff allow it to have a chemical analysis
made of the remaining contents of the bottle. Plaintiff refused, and
the defendant moved that he be required to deposit the bottle with the
clerk of court so as to permit an analysis to be made. The trial court
denied the motion. In affirming, the South Carolifia Supreme Court
held: There is no statutory authorization for requiring a party to pro-
20 In re Elias, 240 Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917). 5 REmINGTO , BANKRVFT
§2428 (4th ed. 1936).
, Power v. Fuhrman, 220 Fed. 787 (C.C.A. 9th 1915).
, See note 14 supra.
'" Other circuits limit the presumption of continued possession according to
circumstances. Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F. 2d 325 (C.C.A. 4th 1945), 31 VA. L.
REv. 938, affirming 55 F. Supp. 129 (D.C. Md. 1944), 31 VA. L. REv. 204.
s In 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 789 (1947) the decision of the circuit court of appeals
in committing the bankrupt for contempt is strongly condemned.
'Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S. C. 516, 46 S.E. 2d 147 (1948).
(Vol'.2
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duce and permit inspection of chattels in his posession, and the court
possesses no inherent power to grant such relief.
In regard to the discovery of evidence within a party's possession
or knowledge, the early common law courts laid down the rule that
no one is required to furnish evidence to his adversary.2 This rule
worked a great hardship on litigants when a part or all of their evidence
lay exclusively within the knowledge .or possession of their opponent.
Chancery, to prevent this injustice, ahd in the exercise of its inherent
power to probe the consciences of fhe suitors, developed the bill of
discovery.3 By means of this bill, a party could require his adversary
to give evidence under oath, or to produce papers and documents in his
control or possession. 4 The evidence thus procured could then be
used in an action at law. However, one could obtain only evidence ma-
terial to his own case or defense, and not evidence material only to his
opponent's case. 5 And the rule of privilege applied. 6 Under the same
bill, chancery allowed the inspection of chattels in a party's possession
or control when the administration of justice required. 7
Inspection of chattels has been allowed under a bill of discovery in
the United States.8 It has also been allowed incidentally in suits for
relief in equity.9 Under the codes, some cases have allowed inspection
of chattels on the theory that the courts possess inherent power to
grant such relief.10 Other cases have denied inspection for the reason
I Union P. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890); Dell v. Taylor, 6 Dowl.
& R. 388 (1825); 3 BL. Comm. *381, 382; 6 WIGmooE EVmENCE §1862 (3rd ed.
1940).
'People exr rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927);
1 Po MEoY, EQUITY JuRispRuDEFNCE §190a (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
'1 POMEROY, EQUITY JuRIsPRuDENcE §190a (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
'Carpenter v. Wynn, 221 U. S. 533, 54 (1910); Combe v. London, 4 Y. &
C. 139, 160 Eng. Rep. 953 (1840) ; Hunt v. Hewitt, 7 Exch. 236, 155 Eng. Rep.
953 (1852).
'Re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E. 2d 492 (1936); Calcraft v. Guest,
[1898] 1 Q.B. 759, 78 L.T. (N.S.) 283; 1 'PoaERoY, EQUITY JURISPRuDENcE
§203 (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).7 Marsden v. Panshall, 1 Vern. 403, 23 Eng. Rep. 548 (1686) (inspection of
pawned clothes allowed under bill of discovery to enable plaintiff to bring action
at law); Earl of Macclesfield v. Davis, 3 Ves. & B. 16, 35 Eng. Rep. 385 (1814)
(inspection of heirlooms ordered in suit in chancery); 6 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§1862 (3rd ed. 1940).
'Reynolds v. Burgess Sulfite Fibre Co., 71 N.H. 332, 51 Atl. 1075 (1902)
(inspection of broken strap alleged to have caused injury allowed under bill of
discovery to enable plaintiff to prepare case at law).
. 'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Griesa, 156 Fed. 398 (C.C. Kan. 1907) (exhumation
and examination of body of deceased ordered in suit to cancel insurance policy) ;
Diamond Match Co. v. Oshkosh Match Works, 63 Fed. 984 (C.C. Wis. 1894)
(inspection ordered in suit to enjoin patent infringement); McLeod Tire Corp.
v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 268 Fed. 205 (S.D. N.Y. 1920) (inspection ordered in
patent infringement suit); Rowell v. William Koehl Co., 194 Fed. 446 (W.D.
N.Y. 1912).
"E.g., Arkansas Utilities Co. v. Pipkin, 202 Ark. 314, 150 S.W. 2d 38 (1941)
(inspection of equipment and safety appliances on premises) ; Clark v. Tulare Lake
Dredging Co., 14 Cal. App. 414, 112 Pac. 564 (1910) (inspection of machinery
on barge allowed); Sinclair Oil Refining Co. v. Nat. L. McGuire Oil & Supply
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that they lacked such power."
No case involving inspection of chattels has been reported in North
Carolina. The legislature has abolished the bill of discovery,12 and
provided a statutory substitute. 13 No provision is made for inspection
of chattels. However, it seems that the statute merely substitutes a
simplified procedure for the bill, and does not affect the inherent power
of the court in its equitable jurisdiction to do justice between the
parties.14 This conclusion is supported by Flythe v. The Eastern Caro-
li-na Coach Co.,' 5 in which the supreme court held that a trial court
has inherent power to order a physical examination of a plaintiff in a
personal injury action when it finds that justice to the defendant re-
quires it, even though there is no statutory authorization.
There would seem to be little, if any, reason for a distinction be-
tween the power to order an inspection of chattels, and the power to
order an inspection of documents which was inherent in equity. Each
is a species of personal property. The property rights invaded by an
inspection of chattels do not differ in kind or degree from those in-
vaded by an inspection of documents.' 6 Such an inspection may be as
necessary to the administration of justice as an inspection of documents
Co.,-- Mo. App.- , 221 S.W. 378 (1920) (defendant allowed to inspect
to see how much oil plaintiff had on hand and its value) ; State ex rel. American
Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 270 Mo. 533, 194 S.W. 268 (1917) (inspection allowed
of machinery and premises); Driver v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 58 Ohio App. 299,
16 N.E. 2d 548 (1938) (discovery of tube of mascara allowed in order to have it
analyzed).
"
1 E.g., Martin v. Elliot, 106 Mich. 130, 63 N.W. 998 (1895); Wilson v Col-
lins, 57 Misc. 365,- 109 N. Y. Supp. 662 (1908) ; Downes v. McAleen, 16 N. Y.
Supp. 916 (City Court of New York 1891); Cook v. The Lalance Grojean Mfg.
Co., 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 332, 29 Hun. 641 (1883). See cases collected in 33
A. L. R. 16.
"2N C. GEN. STAT. §1-568 (1943) (No action to obtain a discovery under
oath in aid of the prosecution or defense of another action shall be allowed, nor
shall any examination of a party be had on behalf of the adverse party, except
in the manner prescribed by this article.). Query: Does this statute abolish all
discovery, or merely that seeking testimony of a party under oath? Its terms
are limited to examination of parties under oath, with no mention of discovery
of documents which is provided for in another article, nor of discovery or chat-
tels, but the court seems to have interpreted it as abolishing the bill of discovery
completely. See Dunn v. Johnson, 115 N.C. 249, 20 S.E. 390 (1894).3 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-570 and §1-571 (examination of parties); §8-89, and
§8-90 (inspection of books, papers, and documents).
"'Dunn v. Johnson, 115 N. C. 249, 20 S. E. 390 (1894) ; MCINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTIc AND PROCEDURE §86 (1929); 1 Pom-Eaoy, EQuiY Juass-
PRUDENCE §194 (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
"' 195 N. C. 777, 143 S.E. 865 (1928); accord, Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Hill,
90 Ala. 71. 8 So. 90 (189Q); Johnson v. Southern P. R.R., 150 Cal. 535, 89
Pac. 348 (1907); United R. & E. Co. v. Cloman, 107 Md. 690, 69 Atl. 379
(1908); Hess v. Lake Shore & M. S. R.R., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 565 (1882); Wanek
v. Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 80 N.W. 851 (1899); Carnine v. Tibbetts, 158 Ore.
21, 74 P. 2d 974 (1937). Contra: Union Pacific R.R. v. 'Botsford, 141 U. S. 250,
(1890) (Rule 35 of the Fed. R_ Civ. Proc. (1938) now authorizes orders for
.1hysical examinations of parties); Howland v. Beck, 56 F. 2d 35 (C.C.A. 9th
1932); Yazoo & M. V. R.R. v. Robinson, 107 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914);
Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill. 254, 27 N.E. 583 (1906).
"Reynolds v. Burgess Sulfite Fibre Co., 71 N. H. 332, 51 At]. 1075 (1902).
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or the physical examination of a party. It would be an illogical situa-
tion if one could obtain a physical examination of his injured opponent
and yet not be allowed to inspect the chattel alleged to have caused
the injury.'7
Therefore it appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court would
be justified in extending the right of inspection to chattels in a proper
case. The procedure for obtaining such an inspection would seem to
be that approved for physical examinations in the Flythe case, i.e., by
a motion that the court order the party to allow the inspection.
The South Carolina decision is explainable in the light of another
case' 8 holding that the court has no power in absence of statute to
order a physical examination of a party, although the analogy is not
infallible.
A few states have provided for inspection of chattels in their statutes
or rules regulating discovery. 19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
incorporate inspection of chattels into the liberal provisions for inspec-
tion of papers, documents, and premises.2 0
Since other phases of discovery are provided for by statute in North
Carolina, 2 . it would seem desirable that inspection of chattels be so
provided for. In the interest of obtaining uniformity of practice be-
tween the state and Federal courts, as well as to settle any doubt as
to the power of the court to order an inspection of chattels, it is sug-
gested that an adoption by the legislature of the provisions of Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be in order.
22
CHARLES DEXTER POWERS.
17Arkansas Utilities Co. v. Pipkin, 202 Ark. 314, 150 S.W. 2d 38 (1941)
(in which the court said that the power to order inspection of machinery was no
different from the power to order an examination of the person).18Easier v. Southern Ry., 60 S.C. 117, 38 S.E. 258 (1901).
"Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
"Rule 34: Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the courts in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection, and copying or photographing, by 'or on behalf of the moving party
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26
(b) .and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (2) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession
or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope of
the examination permitted by Rule 26(b). The order shall specify the time,
place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
"Excepting, of course, physical examinations of parties.
"Arizona and Colorado have adopted Rule 34 of the Fed. R. Clv. Proc. as it
stood before amendment in 1947. See Aiuz. CoaE ANN. §21-736 (1939), and
Colo. R. Civ. Proc. (1941) Rule 34.
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Injunction-Employee's Agreement Not to Compete-
Partial Performance
Defendant agreed at the time of employment as route salesman for
plaintiff's beauty parlor- supply company in North and South Caro-
lina, that for a period of. five years from any termination thereof, he
Would not own or operate any business selling the same type of mer-
chandise, or contact any account handling such merchandise, in either
North or South Carolina. Upon defendant's termination of employment
he immediately accepted employment with a competitor of plaintiff and
approached customers in eastern North Carolina that he had previously
called on for plaintiff. On appeal by plaintiff from a judgment dis-
solving a temporary restraining order, held: affirmed. Since plaintiff
had operated a business only in eastern North Carolina, the contract
restriction against competition in North and South Carolina was un-
reasonable and void as against public policy."
Where the interest of the employer sought to be protected is an
appropriate one, North Carolina will enforce employees' restrictive
covenants not to compete if founded on "valuable considerations and
. . necessary to protect the interests of the party in whose favor they
are imposed, and do not unduly prejudice the public interest."'2 "To
this must be added the condition that they do not impose unreasonable
hardship on the covenantor. . . ." Except for the territorial aspect,
the instant case seems to be one where injunction normally would issue,
The employee's promise was given in consideration of an original con-
tract of employment.4 The employee had a personal association with
plaintiff's customers which, when his employment terminated, would
enable him to injure the business of plaintiff if employed by a com-
petitor.5 And the five year term of the restriction has been held
reasonable. 6
In the light of other North Carolina decisions, if the covenant in the
instant case had covered only the named cities or counties within which
plaintiff did business, an injunction probably would have been
granted. 7 The court's justification for denying injunction in the princi-
Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N. C. 242, 45 S. E. 2d 121 (1947).
'Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C. 154, 160, 29 S. E. 2d 543, 547 (1944) (while this
case states the general rule followed in North Carolina in previous cases, the
court held that the facts of the case did not justify enforcement of the restriction).
' Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C. 154, 161, 29 S. E. 2d 543, 547 (1944) (this seems
to be the first case in which the North Carolina court expressly adds this con-
dition to the general rule).
4Id. at 163, 29 S. E. 2d at 548.
'Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg. 199 N. C. 539, 545, 155 S. E. 154, 157 (1930).
'Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N. C. 670. 93 S. E. 2d 476 (1940).
Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N. C. 387, 42 S. E. 2d 352 (1947) (forty-
nine counties); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 227 N. C. 96, 40 S. E. 2d
696 (1946) (city of Winston-Salem and thirteen counties); Beam v. Rutledge,
217 N. C. 670. 9 S. E. 2d 476 (1940) (city of Lumberton and 100 miles there-
from) ; Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N. C. 539, 155 S. E. 154 (1930) (city
of High Point and a fifteen mile radius).
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pal case was that "The Court cannot by splitting up the territory make
a new contract for the parties-it must stand or fall integrally."8
Where the territory embraced in restrictive covenants is unreason-
able, but is expressed in divisible terms, i.e., in terms of local geo-
graphical or governmental units, the majority of the courts enforce
the covenant in as many of the units as are reasonable and disregard
the remainder. 9 To some extent, the North Carolina case of Sonotone
Corp. v. Baldwin'0 takes this view. There, the employee's territory
included forty-nine counties, but the restricted territory included the
same counties plus an area fifty miles wide on every side of those
counties. The injunction included only the forty-nine counties, but
with no mention of the fifty mile strip.
Where the territory is unreasonable but is not described in separable
local units, the majority view has been that the entire territorial re-
striction is void." The minority view, however, favors enforcement
of the restriction in as much of the territory as is shown to be rea-
sonable, even at the administrative cost of newly defining the smaller
area, and the tendency of the American cases is toward this view.' 2
A case adopting this view is Nezu England Tree Expert Co. v. Rus-
sell.13 Defendant was a salesman of arboricultural services, including
tree surgery and landscaping, under an express covenant not to com-
pete in the New England states after the termination of employment.
Plaintiff's business was concentrated in Rhode Island, and in parts of
Connecticut and Massachusetts; defendant's sales territory was confined
to a part of Massachusetts. Upon defendant's resignation, he estab-
lished a competitive business in his original sales territory. The court
granted an injunction as to the original sales territory and the remainder
of the territory intensively covered by plaintiff's solicitors. In affirm-
ing the injunction the court said, "The defendant is bound by his
covenant to the extent necessary for the protection of the good will
of the plaintiff's business."'14 Another illustration is a Texas case
where defendant was given sixty-six counties, including the city of
Fort Worth, as his territory for the sale of adding machines, with a
covenant not to compete in this territory for a period of one year from
the termination of 'his employment. Defendant actually sold only in
Fort Worth, and upon termination of his employment, he undertook to
8 Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N. C. 242, 245, 45 S. E. 2d 121, 123 (1947).
*5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1659 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.).
10227 N. C. 387, 42 S. E. 2d 352 (1947).
115 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1660 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.), and
cases cited; Automobile Club v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq. 202, 12 A. 2d 369 (Ch.
1940).
1IS WILLISTOs, CoNmAcrs §1660 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.).
" 306 Mass. 504, 28 N. E. 2d 997 (1940).
" Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926) (covenant as
to state of Massachusetts unreasonable, but reasonable and enforceable in city
of Boston).
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sell a competitive line ii Fort Worth. The Texas court in granting an
injunction for Fort Worth only said, "An injunction on these facts for
all sixty-six counties would be unreasonable, . . . the court may limit
an injunction to the territory within which defendant's employment
has given him an aquaintance with plaintiff's business."'1
This view seems to reach much the better result. It has the merit of
protecting the employer's interest without an undue burden on the
employee. This is not the making of a new contract by the court, but
is an equitable limitation on the extent to which the remedy of injunc-
tion will be used to enforce the contract as written. See Sonotone
Corp. v, Baldwin, supra.
The differences between the courts' decisions in these cases seem
to depend more upon the form than upon the substance of the restric-
tive agreement. The reason most often advanced against partial en-
forcement of indivisible employee covenants is that it encourages em-
ployers with superior bargaining power to insist on unreasonable and
excessive restrictions knowing that they will get at least a part if not all
of what they seek.1 6 This argument loses most if not all of its validity
when it is considered that the employer by skilful wording of a cove-
nant can obtain the same result by describing the same territory in
terms of separable local units.
At least six state courts today grant partial performance of em-
ployee agreements not to compete, even though the territory was de-
scribed in the agreement as an apparently indivisible area. 17 Two
Federal courts are in accord.1 8
"
5Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S. W. 2d 344 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935).
165 WiLLIsToN, CONTRAcrs 4685 (Rev. ed. 1937).
'ANew England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E. 2d 997
(1940); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S. W. 2d 344 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935); Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal. 379, 30 P. 2d 997 (1934) (where
statute limits restriction to one county or part thereof); Davey Tree Expert
Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S. W. 2d 62 (1930); Edgecomb v. Edmonston,
257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926); cf. American Weekly v. Patterson, 179 Md.
109, 16 A. 2d 912 (1940) ; General Paint Co. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 611, 12
P. 2d 990 (1932) ; Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. 2d 451 (C. C.
A. 5th 1930) ; J. L. Davis, Inc. v. Christopher, 219 Ala. 346, 122 So. 406 (1929) ;
Moore & Handley v. Towers, 87 Ala. 207, 6 So. 41 (1889) (both Alabama cases
involve restrictions on vendors with no limitations as to territory set out. The
court construed the territory as the previous area of competition and held this
to be reasonable.).
"
8Cropper v. Davis, 243 F. 310 (C. C. A. 8th 1917) (a Nebraska case hold-
ing where the territory is unlimited but the territory where a, similar business
would be in competition with plaintiff can be ascertained, the contract will be
limited to that territory) ; cf. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. 2d 112 (N. Y.
1931) ("Full effect may be given to the restrictive covenant by construing
it as covering the same places where the defendant was then carrying on his
business in New Jersey and New York. This construction has the merit that
it makes the agreement valid, and as between two possible constructions, one




It is submitted that in the instant case the court, would have adopted
the better view and followed the modern trend had it upheld the cove-
nant as far as it was shown to be reasonable, namely, eastern North
Carolina, and thus given the employer the protection needed.
MARTIN B. SImPsoN, JR.
Mortgages-Absolute Deeds--Binding as Against the
Grantor (Mortgagor); Void as Against Creditors
Courts throughout the United States recognize that a deed, although
absolute in form, upon proper proof will be considered a mortgage.'
Courts differ, however, in determining what constitutes proper proof.
Apparently North Carolina is the only state requiring proof of some
general ground of equitable relief before parol evidence will be ad-,
mitted to show that the deed, although absolute in form, was in fact
intended as a mortgage. 2 All other states seem to have abandoned this
strict view and will permit reformation if there is sufficient parol proof
of the intent to establish a security.3 The standard statement of the
North Carolina court is that two things must be proved, "1. It must
appear that the clause of redemption was omitted through ignorance,
mistake, fraud, or undue advantage. 2. The intention [to create a se-
curity] must be established, not by simple declarations of the parties,
but by proof of facts and circumstances dehors the deed, inconsistent
with the idea of an absolute purchase .... -4 It is also a general re-
quirement that the proof be clear, cogent, strong, and convincing.
The most recent statement of this proposition is in Posten v. Bowen5
where the relation of employer-employee was not considered sufficient
in itself to constitute undue advantage6 in the ommission of the clause
of redemption. As a result the grantor was non-suited.
This conservative view would seem to be based upon our court's
almost unswerving adherence to the parol evidence rule and the land
contract section of the Statute of Frauds.7 The court feels that to
allow parol proof of the security intent without first finding general
1 See Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18 for an extensive analysis of the broad proposi-
tion and applicable cases from all jurisdictions; Note, 16 N. C. L REv. 416
(1938) discusses the North Carolina view.
'Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18, 47; 1 JONEs, MORTGAGES §375 (8th ed. 1928),
'Notes, 155 A.L.R. 1104 (1945); 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932).
'E.g., Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N. C. 326, 1 S.E. 2d 824 (1939); Newbern
v. Newbern, 178 N. C. 3, 100 S.E. 77 (1919); Frazier v. Frazier, 129 N. C.
30, 39 S.E. 634 (1901); Watkins v. Williams, 123 N. C. 170, 31 S. E. 388
(1898); Sprague v. Bond, 115 N. C. 530, 20 S.E. 709 (1894); Kelly v. Bryan,
41 N. C. 283 (1849); Streator v. Jones, 10 N. C. 433 (1824) (dissent). For a
more exhaustive list see Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 416 (1938).
5228 N. C. 202, 44 S.E. 2d 881 (1947).
'Variously referred to as undue influence, oppression, or advantage taken
of grantor's necessities.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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grounds for equity jurisdiction would .". . . in effect . . .make titles
to property, which ought to be evidenced by solemn instruments in
writing-to depend . . .on the 'slippery memories' of witnesses .... 
The cases declaring this proposition seem to be completely analogous
to those in which it is attempted to engraft a parol trust in favor of
the grantor upon an absolute deed.9 Such parol trusts are systematically
refused' ° unless there is clear, cogent, strong, and convincing proof
of fraud, ignorance, mistake, undue influence, or a breach of a confi-
dential relationship. The reasons generally used in this situation also
are the parol evidence rule and the land contract section of the Statute
of Frauds." This trust law has been criticized as inconsistent in view
of the fact that parol trusts are freely engrafted upon absolute deeds
when made in favor of a third person contemporaneously with the
deed, without considering that either the parol evidence rule or Statute
of Frauds constitutes an obstacle.' 2
Both the absolute deed as security and the parol trust conveyance
are obviously dangerous and are resorted to only by ill-advised per-
sons who have found themselves in a financial corner. Not the least
danger is that if the deed is recorded and the land sold, the grantor will
be confronted with a perfect record title and he will be unable to re-
deem. At most he will have, an action against his crafty grantee. Fur-
thermore, even if the grantee has retained the title the grantor will
be confronted with what is usually an insurmountable burden of proof,18
since in most instances the defeasance clause was omitted purposely
and not through fraud, mistake, ignorance, or undue advantage. The
grantor simply chose to rely upon his grantee's agreement. Thus the
reports abound with instances where the alleged borrower fails to ob-
tain the desired reformation of the deed. The court must be cautious,
of course, in order to prevent reformation of deeds actually intended
to be absolute.
Although our court has placed what amounts to an insurmountable
requirement of proof upon the grantor when he brings such an action,
an indirect approach exists which might bring the desired relief. A
'Clement v. Cement, 54 N. C. 184, 185 (1854).
0 Ibid.
"E.g., Wadsell v. Aycock, 195 N. C. 268, 142 S.E. 10 (1928); Chilton v.
Smith, 180 N. C. 472, 105 S.E. 1 (1920); Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C. 328,
90 S.E. 304 (1916); Campbell v. Sigmon, 170 N. C. 348, 87 S.E. 116 (1915);
Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S.E. 1028 (1909); Ferguson v. Haas,
64 N. C. 772 (1870).Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 227, 63 S.E. 1028, 1031 (1909).
2 For an analysis of the parol trust cases, mild criticism of results, and
suggested improvement see: Lord and Van Hecke, Parol Trusts in North Caro.
lina, 8 N. C. L. REv. 152 (1929).
" Only the security intent need be proved when the defeasance clause is a
separate writing. Proof of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage is
added only when the defeasance is oral. See Note, 16 N. C. L. Rsv. 416 (1938).
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line of cases14 which is equally well established in our law sets forth
the general proposition that a deed which is intended as security is
void as to creditors of the grantor upon a showing of the security
intent.15 No proof of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage is
required. The deed is said to be void "without regard to any intent
on their part to defraud creditors."' 01 This result is due to a presump-
tion of fraud in .the conveyance in that it tends to defraud, delay, and
hinder creditors in the pursuit of their just claims. 1 7 In short, the
grantor's interest is not properly disclosed, and is thus hidden from
creditors who would otherwise resort to it for the satisfaction of their
claims.
That an anomalous situation is created can be illustrated as follows:
Asume that a distressed debtor did borrow money, did give an abso-
lute deed to secure the debt, cannot prove that the defeasance clause
was omitted due to any of the factors heretofore mentioned, but can
prove facts showing that a security was in fact intended. Then the
deed will stand as an absolute conveyance as against the grantor, but
as against a creditor of the grantor, upon the same proof, the deed is
void. The anomaly is made even more obvious by cases declaring that
the deed is void even as against subsequent'8 creditors of the grantor.' 9
To complete the anomaly pointed out above, even the second prop-
osition that the deed is void as to creditors because it does not disclose
the grantor's interest would appear to rest upon a false premise in
"E.g., Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932); Clement v.
Cozart, 109 N. C. 173, 13 S.E. 862 (1891); Gulley v. Macey, 84 N. C. 434
(1881); Johnson v. Murchison, 60 N. C. 286 (1864); King v..Cantrel, 26 N. C.
251 (1844); Holcombe v. Ray, 23 N. C. 340 (1840); Gregory v. Perkins, 15
N. C. 50 (1833) ; Gaither v. Mumford. 4 N. C. 600 (1816) setble.
1 Note, 16 N. C. L. RLV. 416 (1938) (circumstances considered as factors
bearing on the security intent are distress of the maker, prior negotiation of
the parties, continued existence of the debt, possession by grantor without pay-
ment of rent, and gross inadequacy of the price).
1Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 11, 167 S.E. 383, 384 (1932); Gulley v.
Macey, 84 N. C. 434, 440 (1881).1 N. C. Gnu. STAT. §39-15 (1943) ; cases cited in Note, 16 N. C. L. Rxv. 416
(1938). In some cases the rule is said to be extracted from the general provisions
of -the registration statutes in that the deed cannot be registered as an absolute
deed because the parties did not so intend, nor as a mortgage because it does
hot purport to be one. E.g., Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C. 9, 11, 167 S.E. 383,
384 (1932) ; Bernhardt v. Brovn, 122 N. C. 587, 591, 29 S.E. 884, 885 (1898);
Gulley v. Macey, 84 N. C. 434, 439 (1881).
'Holcombe v. Ray, 23 N. C. 340, 344 (1840); Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C.
9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932) (this point not discussed, but relief was granted in favor
of a subsequent creditor).
"9 Th general rules concerning fraudulent conveyances stem from 13 ELIzA-
BE H . c. 5. The North Carolina version is embodied in N. C. GEI. STAT.
§39-15 (1943) to the effect that conveyances for the purpose of delaying, hinder-
ing, and defrauding creditors shall be "utterly void and of no effect," but the
statute is not always cited by the court. It is interesting to note that North
Carolina usually considers such a conveyance fraudulent and void as against
creditors as a matter of law. Most courts' hold that it is but a badge of fraud
and not conclusive evidence thereof. See Notes, L.R.A. 1916B 18, 576, 68 A.L.R.
306, 317 (1930).
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view of the first proposition that the deed stands absolute as to the
grantor in the absence of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage.
In effect, on the one hand the court is saying, "The deed is absolute
and the grantor has no interest," while, on the other hand, with equal
vigor, it says, "The deed appears absolute, but the grantor has retained
an interest which is not properly disclosed thus the deed is void."
This contradiction of ideas would be eliminated by abolishing the
obsolete North Carolina requirement that fraud, ignorance, mistake,
or undue advantage must first be shown. Then, even in the absence
of such a showing, the debtor would indeed have an interest concealed
by the absolute character of the deed.
With the law of North Carolina in its present condition, the second
proposition that "the deed is void as to creditors of the grantor" would
seem to be of great value to debtors who have been forced to resort
to such a transaction. Such a debtor undoubtedly has creditors among
whom there should be one who is willing to pursue the property in
order to collect his debt. If none exists, then in view of the cases
extending the rule to subsequent creditors, there appears to be no
obstacle to the debtor's approaching a friend or relative for the purpose
of making a bona fide borrowing. By incurring an actual debt and
immediately defaulting, the debtor will enable the new creditor to be
in a position to proceed against the grantee to have the deed declared
void. Thus the burdensome requirement that the grantor must prove
fraud, ignorance, mistake, or undue advantage would seem to be so
easily circumvented as to be of questionable value at best. Furthermore,
the very fact that North Carolina is alone in imposing this require-
ment suggests doubt as to its value.2 0
Doing by indirection whaf cannot be done directly cannot be con-
demned in this instance since ultimate justice is attained. True, the
grantee has taken an absolute deed, but it was offered and accepted
as security for a debt. By a quirk in our law, unless fraud, ignorance,
mistake, or undue advantage can be shown, the deed has a legal effect
different from what the parties intended. The grantee has taken ad-
vantage of a rule of law which is favorable to him. But since the deed
was intended only as security for a debt, why should not the second
proposition be asserted to have the deed declared void? It was intend-
ed as a mortgage and as nothing else, thus the intent of the parties
has been violated no more by the second proposition than by the first.
The grantee-lender has played the ancient game of "heads I win; tails
you lose," for when the suit is at the instance of the grantor the grantee
is in a superior position whether the deed is declared a mortgage or
not. - If construed as a mortgage the grantee can collect the debt, in-
"o See notes 2 and 3, supra.
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terest, and, if the bargain called for it, rent for the time the grantor
remained in possession. 21 If construed as an absolute deed, as usually
happens, the grantee has complete title, probably for an inadequate con-
sideration. By using the creditor approach, the deed may be declared
a nullity and the grantee is defeated in his scheme. And no miscarriage
of justice against the grantee can result, for the creditor does have
to present clear, cogent, strong, and convincing evidence of the intent
to create a security.
JOSEPH C. MooRE, JR.
Parties--Divorce-Right of Guardian or Committee of
Incompetent to Maintain Action
In Phillips v. Phillips, a guardian brought an action for divorce on
behalf of his ward, an insane person, on the ground of adultery com-
mitted by the wife of the ward prior to his insanity. The complaint
alleged that prior to insanity the ward expressed his intention and
desire of getting a divorce from defendant and that at the time of
filing the suit and during a lucid interval when the ward was capable
of understanding the nature of the action, he again expressed the same
intention and desire. It was further alleged that the suit was instituted
pursuant to the ward's direction, desire and will at the time of filing
same. On demurrer, held: the guardian of an insane person' cannot
prosecute an action for divorce on behalf of his ward.
The court here enunciated what seems to be, in the absense of a gov-
erning statutory provision giving a guardian the right to institute a
divorce action on behalf of an insane ward, the universal rule in the
United States.2 The theory behind the rule is that the action of divorce
is one strictly personal and volitional, and the will of the guardian
cannot be substituted for that of the ward who is incapable of excer-
cising any will. The basis of the theory is that there are no offenses,
which by law, work of themselves a dissolution of a marriage, and
there are no offenses which may not be condoned by the injured
spouse.
21 N ote, 16 N. C. L. REv. 416, 418 (1938).
145 S. E. 2d 621 (Ga. 1947).
'Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P. 2d 622 (1946); Worthy v.
Worthy, 36 Ga. 45 (1867); Bradford v. Abend, 89 I1. 78 (1878); Mohler v.
Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 61 N. W. 981 (1895); Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433,
6 Pac. 651 (1885); Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77, 170 S. W. 2d 889 (1943);
Stevens v. Stevens, 266 Mich. 446, 254 N. W. 162 (1934); Higginbotham v.
Higginbotham, - Mo. App.- , 146 S. W. 2d 856 (1940), Cert. denied,
348 Mo. 1073, 156 S. W. 2d 650 (1941); Mohrmann v. Kobb, 291 N. Y. 181,
51 N. E. 2d 921 (1943); Kemmelick v. Kemmelick, 114 Misc. 198, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 3 (1921) ; Mainzer v. Mainzer, 108 Misc. 230, 177 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1919) ;
Dillion v. Dillion, - Tex. Civ. App. , 274 S. W. 217 (1925). See Notes,
70 A. L. R. 964 (1931) and 149 A. L. R. 1284 (1944). Since the commencement
of this note the Georgia court has reiterated the rule in Sternberg v. Sternberg,
46 S. E. Zd 349 (Ga. 1948) ; see note 20 infra for interesting history of this case.
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The rule is an exception to the general rule that a guardian or
committee of an insane person is authorized to enforce, in behalf
of the ward, any cause of action, whether legal or equitable which
ward might enforce if sane.3 It has been the policy of the legisla-
tures and the courts to confer ample protection to the rights and in-
terests on insane litigants, whether they be a party plaintiff or party
defendant.
This exception has arisen due to the history of the action of divorce
and the nature of the marital relation. Since marriage and the family
represent the foundation of our society, the state favors the continuity
of the relationship, and public policy requires that the relationship will
not be severed without adequate cause. There is no common law of
divorce in the United States; divorce law is governed entirely by
legislative enactments. 4 Thus the rule that only if the legislature gives
its express sanction can dissolution of a marriage be made dependent
upon the pleasure or discretion of a legal representative. Further,
most statutes on divorce provide in one fashion or another that the
action for divorce can be maintained by the injured "spouse," and
provide for verification of the petition by affidavit (that the facts there-
in stated are true and/or that the action is not brought out of levity
and through no collusion between husband and wife).r' This statutory
language is also used to support the rule as indicated in the principal
case, since it is said that the legislature 'limited the action to the
spouses, who, if insane, are not qualified to file the petition, or sign the
affidavit.6
Conceding for a moment the validity of the rule, it seems that the
principal case presents a situation where, considering the lucid interval
feature, an exception should be made. The principal case is the first
one where this feature has been presented in the consideration of
'Johnson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N. C. 139, 7 S. E. 2d 475 (1940); Long
v. Town of Rockingham, 187 N. C. 199, 121 S. E. 461 (1924) ; Smith v. Smith,
106 N. C. 498, 11 S. E. 188 (1890); Shaw v. Bwner, 36 N. C. 148 (1840);
N. C. GEN STAT. §1-64 (1943). For collection of cases see 44 C. J. S.: Guardian
and Ward §35 (a) (1945). For collection of statutes see 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS 480 (1932).
'MADDEN, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS §82 (1931).
'E.g. N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-8 (1943) ; by an amendment in 1947 the require-
ment of affidavit as to bringing the action out of levity and by collusion was
omitted, Public Laws 1947, c. 165. For collection of statutes see 2 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 131 (1932).
'E.g. Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 278, 61 N. W. 981, 983 (1895) ("The
statute requires that the petition must be verified by the oath of the plaintiff.
It is true that this requirement is not jurisdictional [North Carolina disagrees
with this statement in Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N. C. 91, 53 S. E. 623 (1906)
and in Nichols v. Nichols, 128 N. C. 108, 38 S. -E. 296 (1901)]. But the fact
that the statute requires the oath of the plaintiff, and provides for no substituted
verification, as in other cases, tends strongly to show that the legislative intent
that an action for divorce should be prosecuted by the injured party, in his
or her personal capacity.").
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
this problem, but the court in the first Georgia case7 deciding the
question of the guardian's right to bring this action, and on which
the court in the instant case relied, foresaw the possibility in -their
opinion, and the dissent here (Chief Justice Jenkins) feels that under
that opinion an insane ward could, during a lucid interval, instruct
his guardian to bring an action for divorce and ;it would be valid.8
But a majority of the court felt otherwise, basing this holding
on the proposition that a guardian appointed by law cannot depend
for his authority on his ward and thereby become accountable as a
kind of private agent or attorney in fact, but he must look exclusively
to the law for his authority to act on behalf of his ward. They proceed.
further to say that, even conceding the contention that the direction
given during the lucid interval had legal force at the time, the direction
or power of attorney would lapse or be suspended by operation of law
on the ward's relapse into insanity.
In making the decision on this basis the court is overlooking the
reason for the rule prohibiting the action in the first place (which they
set out so clearly) and assuming that this is an agency problem,
when the first requisite of agency is lacking-a mutual agreement be-
tween the principal and the agent.9 Here the guardian is appointed
by the law to act on behalf of the ward in the protection of all his
interests. He is given the power to bring any action in the courts on
that behalf, but the law has said that due to the nature of the marital
relationship he will not be allowed to proceed in an action to sever
that relationship since it cannot be known whether the ward- wants a
divorce or not. Here, when he was capable of determining that
question, the ward has clearly indicated his desire for a divorce, and
the action was actually instituted at the express direction of the ward-
during that period of capacity. It seems that any objection to bringing
the action is met, and since insanity does not abate an action legally
instituted 10 the argument of the court as to revocation of authority,
based purely on an agency rule is erroneous. To the added objection
'Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45, 47 (1867) ("It does not appear that, after
her affliction, at any time, she had a lucid interval; for if she had, and that
had been shown, and that during that interval she had directed suit for divorce
to be brought, it-should have been in her own name, without appearance by
next friend. This suit is an indirect admission that she had no lucid interval,
and for the purposes of the decision we will assume that the fact is so." [Note
that here suit was not by a general quardian after an adjudication of insanity,
but by a next friend.D.
'Phillips v. Phillips, 45 S. E. 2d 621, 625 (Ga. 1947).
'REsTATEMENT, AGENCY §1(1) (1933).
" Pictures Corp. v. Karzin, -Mo. App.- , 29 S. W. 2d 757 (1930);
Hargraves v. Thornton, 49 R. I. 302, 142 Ati. 371 (1928). For a most interest-
ing case in North Carolina, which, by using the relation back doctrine in regard
to judgments, made the unique and peculiar ruling that even the death of the
plaintiff during the actual trial of a divorce action did not abate the action,
see Webber v. Webber, 83 N. C. 280 (1880).
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by the Georgia court that the ward might in a subsequent lucid interval
regret the fact that he has been divorced from the bonds of matrimony,
it can be answered that many people who get a divorce regret the
move afterwards, and there are numerous cases of remarriage of
divorcees.
Under the dictum in Worthy v. Worthy" a problem is raised in-
directly as to why the ward did not bring the action himself during
the lucid interval. Is the right of an insane person to act with legal ef-
fect during a lucid interval affected by an adjudicati6n of insanity and
the appointment of a guardian? Any person who has had no inquisition
pass on his sanity is presumed sane and can bring any action until his
insanity is shown by the other party in the particular case, upon whom
all burden on that issue falls. 12 But an adjudication of insanity and
appointment of a guardian have a decided effect on all civil acts of the
party to the adjudication. For example, it is authoritatively stated that
"it may be assumed" that all contracts of a person under guardianship
are void, and it seems that no distinction is made in this holding where it
appears that the transaction was made during a lucid interval, when
he understands its nature.18 Further the adjudication and appointment
of a guardian would have a decided effect on the ward's right to
bring an action, even during a lucid interval. Consider the probative
9ffect of evidence of the adjudication when raised by the party op-
posing the ward. Evidence of the adjudication, at the least, raises a
presumption of insanity in all future cases, and though, to rebut the
presumption, evidence of an adjudication of restoration to sanity is
unnecessary, it requires clear and satisfactory proof to show that person
is of sound mind at a time subsequent to the inquisition declaring him
insane, and this would have to be done before he could commence the
action.14 In many states now, by force of statute, the finding of
insanity is conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the con-
tinuance of the adjudication, and in those states, even though an action
were, brought when the ward was actually lucid, it would have to
be brought by the general guardian if one had been appointed. 15
1' 36 Ga. 45 (1867) (See quote in Note 7 supra).
"E.g. Albertson v. Schmidt, 128 Cal. App. 344, 17 P. 2d 158 (1932) ; Ballew
v. Clark, 24 N. C. 23 (1841).18 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 755 (Rev. ed. 1936). See GA. CODE ANN. §22-206
(1935). For statutes making this the rule see 5 VNrEa, AMFamCAN FAmY
LAWS 514 (1932). It seems, however, that the rule applies only to contracts
involving the estate; it would not apply to such transactions as making a will,
which only the ward could do himself-see Johnson v. Johnson, 214 Minn, 462,
8 N. W. 2d 620 (1943); Wormington v. Wormington, 226 Mo. App. 195, 47
S. W. 2d 172 (1932); Weinberg v. Weinberg, - Misc.-, 8 N. Y. S.
2d. 341 (1938)-in such cases the ordinary voidable rule would apply.
",Akin v. Akin. 163 Ga. 18, 135 S. E. 402 (1926) ; Sutton v. Sutton, 222 N.
C. 277, 22 S. E. 2d 553 (1942) ; Johnson v. Ins. Co., 217 N. C. 143, 7 S. E. 2d
475 (1940) ; Parker v. Davis, 53 N. C. 460 (1862) ; Armstrong v. Short, 8 N. C.
11 (1820). For extended review of cases see Notes, 7 A. L. R. 584 (1920) and
68 A. L. R. 1315 (1930).
" Obrien v. United Bank, 100 Cal. App. 325, 279 Pac. 1048 (1929) ; Gibson v.
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It is not every "lucid interval" that would entitle the ward to bring
an action himself, or that would entitle him to an adjudication of
restoration to sanity, even though he might be said to be capable of
exercising his will and indicating his desire as to the suit for divorce.
"Lucid interval," in the broad medical jurisprudential sense, implies
complete return to reason. 16 But when involved in a litigation, lucid
interval is defined, not generally, but in connection with the transaction
which is under consideration. It is that state of mind in a person
during which he is capable of understanding the nature of the act to
which he attempts to give legal effect. 17 It is a question of proof in
the particular case. It is feasible, therefore, that, although it would
be impossible to prove that the ward here was capable of managing his
estate or instituting actions on his own behalf, it could be shown that
he had mental capacity to exercise his will and indicate his desires as
to his matrimonial status. As it is evident, from his return to in-
sanity, that the ward here was not cured, the above paragraphs should
be sufficient to answer any question as to why he did not bring the
action himself.
Now what of this rule, prohibiting guardians from bringing these
divorce actions, in itself? It is inconsistent with the broad powers of
a guardian, as given by the statutes of all jurisdictions and by the
courts, in connection with the ward and his estate, as will be evidenced
by some examples:
(1) It is a well settled rule that a proceeding for divorce can be
instituted against an insane spouse for a cause of divorce accruing
while he or she was insane.' 8 Defense is then had by the guardian if
one has been appointed, or, if not, by a guardian ad litem, appointed
by the court. This seems as objectionable as would the permitting of
the insane spouse, through his guardian, to institute the action, since,
due to the personal relationship, it is obvious that the insane spouse
is the one most likely to know of such defenses to the action as con-
donation or collusion.1 9
Soper, 72 Mass. 279 (1856); Hamilton v. Henderson, 232 Mo. App. 1234, 117
S. W. 2d 379 (1938); Jacobs v. State, - Misc.- , 24 N. Y. S. 2d 122
(1940).
"25 WoRDs AND PHRASES 722 (1940); BrAcx's LAw DIcTIONARY 1135
(3d ed. 1933).
"'Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 380, 119 Pac. 512 (1911); Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 130 Ill. 466, 22 N. E. 620 (1889); Johnson v. Maine, 83 Me. 182, 22 Atl.
107 (1891); 1 WILLISTON, CONTAcTS §256 (Rev. ed. 1936).
28 Stratford v. Stratford, 92 N. C. 297 (1885) (N. C. has a procedural limita-
tion in its requirement of a showing that a reasonable time has elapsed since
the insanity to allow for recovery and restoration to capacity); the Stratford
case was cited in a recent case which decided only the question. of jurisdiction
and did not pass on the merits of such a case, Smith v. Smith, 226 N. C. 544,
545. 39 S. E. 2d 458, 459 (1946). See cases in Note, 42 A. L. R 1532 (1926).
"'Baker v. Baker, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. (Eng.) 142, 149 (1880).
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(2) Most jurisdictions allow a guardian to institute an action to
annul the marriage of his ward contracted while he was insane.20 The
courts have allowed this action by the guardian on the ground that it
is merely seeking a court declaration of something that is already a
fact-that the marriage never had any validity due to the incapacity
of one of the parties to consent. But it is now evident that marriage
made while one of the parties is of unsound mind does have poten-
tially some of the effects of a valid marriage, because in a majority of
jurisdictions, such a marriage is not void, but voidable, and even in
those jurisdictions that use the term "void" when referring to such
a marriage, it is held that the marriage can be ratified by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval.2 1 Is this action by the guardian not
interfering with the personal right of the incompetent to ratify the
marriage?
(3) A guardian has been allowed to bring an action for judicial
separation or limited divorce, or for alimony, on behalf of his ward.22 '
It is said that this is allowed because such an action is based on the
continuation of the marriage relationship, but it is evident that this
is interfering with the right of the insane spouse to have the continued
comfort from the erring spouse's companionship and care if he or she
so desires it, despite the offenses. It is to be noted that verification
is generally required of petitions for limited divorce, as they are in
case of absolute divorce, but this has not been considered as an ob-
jection to the guardian's bringing this action, as it was in suits for
absolute divorce.2 3
(4) It is the general rule, absent the factor of adjudication of in-
sanity, that a lunatic's ordinary contracts made while insane are void-
able only, and may be ratified by him during a lucid interval.2 4 But in
o Note, 70 A. L. R. 964 (1931) and Note, 149 A. L. P. 1284 (1944). Three
of the jurisdictions that have refused to allow this action by the guardian base
their decisions on the peculiar wording of their annulment statutes-Langdon v.
Hadley, 85 Ind. App. 515, 150 N. E. 793 (1926); Pence v. Aughe, 101 Ind. 317
(1885) ; Winslow v. Troy, 97 Me. 130, 53 Atl. 1008 (1902) ; Weinberg v. Wein-
berg, - Misc.- , 8 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (1938) (N. Y. has the incongruous
rule that a general guardian cannot bring the action, but a guardian ad litenm can.).
Georgia has the peculiar rule that equity has no jurisdiction to hear an annulment
proceeding at all, since insanity at the time of the marriage is made a ground
for divorce in their statute, Johnson v. Johnson, 172 Ga. 273, 157 S. E. 689(1931). This rule has led to the result that an insane spouse, who was so
at the time of the marriage, is bound to the relationship, Sternberg v. Stern-
berg, 46 S. E. 2d 349 (Ga. 1948).
"I Watters v. Watters, 168 N. C. 411, 84 S. E. 703 (1915) ; MADDEN, DomESTIC
RELATIONS p. 27 (1931).
"Wray v. Wray, 33 Ala. 187 (1858); Mims v. Mims, 38 Ala. 98 (1858);
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N. Y. 366, 176 N. E. 426 (1931).
"White v. White, 179 N. C. 592, 103 S. E. 216 (1920) ; Jones v. Jones, 173
N. C. 279, 91 S. E. 960 (1917): Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N. C. 229, 72 S. E.
876 (1911); Clark v. Clark, 133 N. C. 28, 45 S. E. 342 (1903); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 132 N. C. 22, 43 S. E. 508 (1903) ; Baker v. Baker, L. R. 5 Prob. Div.(Eng.) 142 (1880): 2 VERNIm, AMEICAN FAMILY LAWS 344 (1932).I WILLISTON. CONTActs 741 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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England ratification by the guardian of contracts made by his ward
while insane is upheld, and in the U. S. it is held that a guardian
can disaffirm the ward's contracts so made.25 This is done despite
the language in the cases that the right to affirm or disaffirm such
contracts is a "personal" right of the lunatic. 26
It seems, too, considering the principal purpose of guardianship-
the protection of the estate of the incompetent ward-that the rule is
objectionable from a public policy standpoint: (1) The estate of an
incompetent husband remains liable for the support of the wife, and
it has been held that a husband can get allotments from his insane
wife's estate under certain circumstances. 27 Should this duty continue
when the sane spouse has repudiated the marital obligation by offenses
against it? The erring spouse will be left in possession of proprety
settled on him or her by the laws of descent and distribution or by
the insane spouse (as by will made prior to the offense and the in-
sanity). (3) Where the wife is the erring spouse, spurious offspring
may be foisted on the insane husband and his family by which the
devolution of his property might be divested in favor of illegitimate
objects.
The above considerations and others led the English courts to
allow a guardian to bring the action for divorce on behalf of his ward
without express authorization in 1880, only 23 years after the courts
were first given jurisdiction to decree absolute divorces.28 Prior to
this date Massachusetts in 1835 and Rhode Island in 1867 had already
passed statutes permitting a guardian to bring the action.2 9 At least
one writer has advocated legislation on the subject, and one court
recognized the harshness of the rule in a recent case.3 0 Then in 1941
the Alabama court moved into the field of divorce with what appears
to be some judicial legislation-it recognized the general rule, but
proceeded to allow the action for divorce brought by a guardian on
" 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS 745 (Rev. ed. 1936).
" Langley v. Langley, 45 Ark. 392 (1885) ; Orr v. Equitable Mtge. Co.. 107 Ga.
499, 33 S. E. 708 (1899); Downham v. Halloway, 158 Ind. 626, 64 N. E. 82
(1902); McLure Realty Co. v. Eubanks, 151 Ga. 763, 108 S. E. 204 (1921).
"
TReynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 254, 180 S. E. 70 (1935); Re Hybard,
119 N. C. 359, 25 S. E. 963 (1896); Brooks v. Brooks, 25 N. C. 389 (1843);
N. C. GEN. STAT. §35-13 (1943); Note, 160 A. L. R. 1439 (1946); lNote, 59
A. L. R. 654 (1929).
" Baker v. Baker, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. (Eng.) 142 (1880) ; 20 and 21 Vict. c.
85 (1857).
"Cowan v. Cowan, 139 Mass. 377, 1 N. E: 152 (1885); Garnett v. Garnett
114 Mass. 379 (1874); Thayer v. Thayer, 9 R. I. 377 (1869); MASS. GEN. LAWS
c. 208 §7 (1932); R. I. GEN. LAws c. 416 §9 (1938).
. Note, 4 TEXAS L. Rzv. 255, 256 (1925). See Johnson v. Johnson, 294 Ky. 77,
79, 170 S. W. 2d 889, 891 (1943) ("It may be that in some cases a hardship will
be reached by the conclusion here, but stability of the marriage relationship is
a matter of public concern and, in the absence of specific legislative declaration
to the contrary, its continuance or dissolution should not be dependent on the
pleasure or discretion of a legal representative.").
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behalf of his insane ward on the ground that their general statute
authorizing an insane person to sue by guardian was to be construed
as in pani materia with the statutes authorizing courts of equity grant
divorces. 3 1 They held that this was "express" authorization for the
action by the guardian. This is a revolutionary step and could be the
impetus for upsetting the rule as emphasized in the principal case.
Finally, where a court of a foreign country has construed a statute
thereof as authorizing the guardian, of an incompetent to maintain the
divorce suit, neither such construction nor a divorce so obtained can
be assailed in this country.3 2 This would seem to indicate that public
policy does not prohibit such a divorce action.
The question of a guardian suing for divorce on behalf of his
ward has never been directly presented in North Carolina, though the
Supreme Court recognized the general rule on the problem in Smith. v.
Swith.33 North Carolina has been cited as one of the minority states
allowing the suit for divorce by the guardian, 4 but the case relied on
involved an action to annul the marriage contracted by an insane
ward.3 5 Though, in that case, the court speaks of the action as one
for divorce, this is only for certain purposes, and the nature of the
two actions are entirely different.3 6 Certainly the dictum in that case
might lead to the conclusion that this state might allow a guardian
to bring the action for divorce,3 7 but that case is not authority for
such a holding.
It is submitted that, in anticipation of the situation where there is
a need for a guardian to bring an action for divorce for the protection
of his ward, the legislature would do well to amend .the divorce laws
to authorize such a suit. Insanity in divorce actions is familiar to
our legislative body, for they passed in 1945 an amendment making
insanity a ground for divorce in a proceeding brought by the sane
spouse.3 8 This was clearly a wise move in view of the social and fi-
nancial implications of a spouse being left alone in the world, despite
Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401 (1941).
2McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 132 Cal. 85, 64 Pac. 103 (1901), aff'd,
188 U. S. 291 (1902).
3226 N. C 544, 546, 39 S. E. 2d 458, 460 (1946).
" Dillion v. Dillion, - Tex. Civ. App.- , 274 S. W. 217, 219 (1925);
19 C. J. 98 §230 n. 42 (1920) ; 17 Am. JuR.: DIVORCE AND SEPAATION §272 n.
13 (1944); 11 N. C. DIGEST 21, Key no. 93.
:"Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407 (1897).
3Lea v. Lea, 104 N. C. 603, 606, 10 S. E. 488, 491 (1899) ("An action to
have a marriage declared void because of a pre-existing disqualification to enter
into the relation is an action for divorce and alimony pendente lite may be
allowed.").
mv. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 299, 28 S. E. 407, 409 (1897) ("Such action
Efor annulment of a marriage] is for divorce and all actions for a lunatic can
be brought either in the name of the guardian or in the name of the lunatic
by the guardian.").
"
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-5(6) (1945 Supp.). For other states having similar
statutes see 29 VA. L. REV. 771 (1943).
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the fact that this is due to no fault of the insane defendant. In view
of the discussion in this note it seems that the suggested legislation is
now in order to make the divorce picture complete for the good of the
parties and the public as well. It might be suggested that the amend-
ment should embody a limitation such as the courts have put on the
right to bring the action against an insane spouse for cause-a re-
quirement of a showing that a reasonable time has elapsed to allow
for return to sanity; and in view of the strides in medical approach
to insanity, there might be added some such requirement as affidavit
by medical authorities as to the permanence of the insanity.
It has not been overlooked that there are statutes that would give
,some degree of protection to the estate of a husband or wife when
one spouse has committed a marital offense, and it is understood that
the courts might offer other protection too.3 9 But in view of the fact
that the statutes and the court relief referred to could not alleviate
injustice that might arise from the operation of the rule that binds
an insane spouse to his marriage despite any breach of the relationship
by the sane spouse, and the fact that public policy seems to demand
some relief where the relationship is so debauched, this further legis-
lation is in order at this time. It does not appear that the guardian
could possibly use this power arbitrarily since he is in reality an officer
of the court and under its surveillance at all times.
R. W. BRADLEY, JR.
Pleading-Oral Contract to Devise-Recovery
on Quantum Meruit
P brought action for breach of contract, alleging that deceased
promised to devise all of his property to P if she and her husband
3I. N. C. GErN. STAT. §28-11 (1943) (Elopement and adultery of wife is for-
feiture of her right to a distributive share in the husband's personalty) ; §28-12(Abandonment and living in adultery at time of death of wife, or if wife gets
divorce a mensa, husband forfeits his right to distributive share in wife's per-
sonalty) ; §30-4. (Adultery of wife is bar to dower if she is not living with
husband at -time of his death); §52-21 (Following acts of wife bar right to
dower, distributive share in husband's personalty, right to year's provision, right
to administer on his estate, and right to all estate in property of the husband
settled on her on the sole consideration of the marriage: elopement with adulterer,
abandonment, divorce a mensa at thd instance of the husband); §52-22 (Same
provisions as in §52-21 made applicable to the husband and his forfeiture of
rights).
II. Re Miegocki 34 Luzerne Leg. Rep. (Pa.) 257 (1940) (At least this one
case has been found that indicated that the wife of an incompetent, in order that
she may not become a public charge should be allowed her necessary support from
his estate, unless it appears that she is guilty of such conduct as to warrant
the conclusion that she has forfeited her right to su-pport.).
III. There is possibility that illegitimate children may be precluded from
sharing in the estate of the insane party, for illegitimacy of child born in wed-
lock is an issue of fact, resting on proof of husband's impotency or non access
to wife during period in which child was begotten. See State v. Green, 210
N. C. 162, 185 S. E. 670 (1936).
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would live with him and care for him during his lifetime. P lived in the
home of deceased for six years, during which time she rendered valu-
able services, but deceased left all of his property by will to his wife.
P was allowed recovery of damages for breach of contract in the trial
court. Held: The special contract, being within the Statute of Frauds,
is unenforceable; however, the complaint is- broad enough to support a
recovery on quantum meruit without amendment, hence the case is
remanded for trial on this theory.-
While the general rule in North Carolina2 is that a parol contract
to devise realty, or real and personal property, is within the Statute of
Frauds, a few cases3 seem to indicate that such a contract is not ren-
dered unenforceable. Hence actions are sometimes brought on the
special contract. Under code pleading, recovery should be allowed the
plaintiff regardless of whether the remedy is on the contract or in
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of nongratuitous services
rendered so long as the facts showing such service are alleged and
proven.4 In 1878 Chief Justice Smith speaking of the Code System
said, 5 "It is the apparent purpose of the new system, while simplify-
ing the method of procedure, to afford any relief to which a plaintiff
may be entitled upon the facts set out in his complaint, although mis-
conceived and not specially demanded in his prayer. In the present
case the essential facts are contained in the pleadings, and whether
the remedy is on the special contract or on what are called the common
counts, it ought not be denied."
Since this decision declaring that a plaintiff will not be denied
relief when the facts alleged show a good cause of action, regardless
of the fact that the plaintiff misconceived his remedy, numerous cases0
have held that the failure to prove an alleged express contract does
'Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N. C. 540, 46 S. E. 2d 561 (1948).
'N. C. GEN. STAT., §22-2 (1943); E.g., Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N. C. 429,
- S.E. 2d- (1947) ; Dunn v. Brewer, 228 N. C. 43, 44 S. E. 2d 353 (1947);
Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N. C. 103, 29 S. E. 2d 206 (1944);
Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N. C_. 528, 27 S. E. 2d 466 (1943) ; Price v. Askins,
212 N. C. 583, 194 S. E. 284 (19,37).
, Hager v. Whitner, 204 N. C. 747, 169 S. E. 645 (1933) (oral contract to
devise land. Court held Statute of Frauds not applicable to the facts in this
case.) ; Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N. C. 161, 150 S. E. 881 (1929) ("This court
and the courts generally have upheld and enforced oral contracts to devise or
convey land in consideration of services rendered."); Lipe v. Houck, 128 N. C.
115, 38 S. E. 297 (1901) (court allowed an action for breach of an oral contract
to devise land). But cf. Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331
(1933); 15 N. C. L. REv. 203 (1937).
4 Wittkowski v. Harris, 64 F. 712 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1894) ("New and liberal
rules of pleading established that a party may recover judgment for any re-
lief to which the facts alleged and proved entitle him, although not demanded
in his complaint."); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAdrICE AND PROCEDURE
§370 (1929).
Dissenting opinion in Jones v. Mial, 79 N. C. 164, 167 (1878). This dissent
was followed by the court on rehearing in Jones v. Mial, 82 N. C. 252 (1880).
'E.g., Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N. C. 67, 33 S. E. 2d 477 (1945); Grady
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not preclude recovery on quantum mervit for services proved to have
been rendered. In Stokes v. Taylor7 the plaintiff declared on an oral
contract, proved services performed, but failed in the proof of the spe-
cial contract. The court held that the facts were stated broadly
enough to allow recovery either on the special contract or upon quan-
tumt ieruit without amendment of the complaint. In Grantham v.
Grantham8 action was brought for specific performance of an oral
contract to devise property in consideration of support and care. The
contract was held unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds,
but an action in quantum meruit was said to be enforceable upon the
complaint since the prayer for specific performance does not determine
the scope of the plaintiff's right to relief when sufficient facts are
alleged to show services rendered. In Edwards v. Matthews9 the
plaintiff declared on an express contract. In affirming the trial court's
submission of the express contract to the jury along with the issue
of quantum reruit,'0 the court held that the failure to prove the ex-
press contract did not preclude recovery for services which the evi-
dence shows the plaintiff rendered to defendant's testator upon a
quantum meruit.
However, two cases have caused confusion in this field. In 1921
the court said," "As the plaintiff is suing on a quantum reruit, she
thereby renounces all right to-recover on the special contract. She is
not entitled to recover on both causes, as they are inconsistent reme-
dies, and, therefore, she is required to make her election between the
two." This case, however, can be distinguished from the principal
case in that the action was based on part performance, with the promi-
sor still living.'-
v. Faison, 224 N. C. 567, 31 S. E. 2d 760 (19.44) ; Lipe v. Citizens Bank and
Trust Co., 206 N. C. 24, 173 S. E. 316 (1934); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C.
363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933); Brown v. Williams, 196 N. C. 247, 145 S. E. 233
(1928); Edwards v. Matthews, 196 N. C. 39, 144 S. E. 300 (1928); Deal v.
Wilson, 178 N. C. 600, 101 S. E. 205 (1919) ; Debruhl v. New Bern Bank & Trust
Co., 172 N. C. 839, 90 S. E. 9 (1916) ; Moffitt v. Glass, 117 N. C. 142, 23 -S. E.
104 (1895); Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C. 394, 10 S. E. 566 (1889); Miller v.
Lash, 85 N. C. 52 (1881).
1104 N. C. 394, 10 S. E. 566 (1889).
8205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933).
196 N. C. 39, 144 S. E. 30 (1928).
"The doctrine of election of remedies is beyond the scope of this note. Al-
though the question as to the propriety of submission of the issues of express
contract and quantum ineruit to the jury in the alternative is not settled, it
seems that under proper instructions it should be permitted and several decisions
seem to so indicate. MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE
§§354, 401 (1929).
"
1Hayman v. Davis, 182 N. C. 563, 109 S. E. 554 (1921).
2Action on the express contract could not be brought until the death of the
promisor since a breach would not occur until then. Hence by suing for the
value of services rendered before breach, the plaintiff repudiates the contract,
although it would still be admissible in evidence to prove the services were not
rendered gratuitously. Cf. Miller v. Lash, 85 N. C. 52 (1881) ; Patterson v. Frank-
lin, 168 N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18 (1914).
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In Graham v. Hoke,'3 however, the plaintiff rendered personal
services to deceased in reliance on his promise of $2,000 to be paid out
of his estate at death. The court held that "the plaintiff having de-
clared on a 'written agreement' as a special contract, she is not al-
lowed to likewise declare upon an implied contract of quantum meruit,
and in truth she has not so declared. True she may have pleaded an
implied contract as well as a special contract in the alternative, but
when the case came on for trial she could have been compelled to elect
upon which declaration she would proceed." This decision was a de-
parture from the established line of decisions, as well as from the
spirit and purpose of the Code System. Sufficient facts were set out
to establish a cause of action in quantum meruit, and in allowing a
demurrer the court was reverting to the technical pleading of common
law by placing more emphasis on the form or theory of the action than
on the facts presented.
The principal case clarifies the position of the court and indicates
a return to, and reaffirmance of, the liberal policy of the Code to allow
any relief to which the facts proven may entitle the plaintiff to re-
cover.1 4 'It establishes the rule that a plaintiff may declare on an ex-
press oral contract to devise realty and, if sufficient fact are alleged and
proven of services rendered, recover on quantum reruit when the con-
tract is unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds, thus
clearly indicating that there will be no binding election in this situation.
Notwithstanding that relief may be secured under this mode of
pleading, it is submitted that the desirable method is to set out the
express contract and implied contract separately, or to state the ex-
press contract as an inducement or explanation of the implied con-
tract and allege that the deceased received the benefits of service in-
duced thereby.15
ROBERT G. STOCKTON.
Taxation-Interrelation of Income and Gift Taxes-Gift Tax
Status of Income of Trust Which Is Taxable to Donor
The Commissioner assessed gift* taxes against the respondent for
the net gains and profits from trading in securities and commodity fu-
tures of two trusts created by the respondent and his wife for the
benefit of their three children. The trusts were irrevocable, and the
settlor retained no right to alter or amend the ti-ust instrument, or to
change the beneficial interests. The trusts consisted of trading ac-
counts *on the books of a partnership composed of the respondent, his
13219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. 2d 790 (1941).
" CLARK, CODE PLEADING §43 (2d ed. 1947).
10MCINTOSH, 'NORTH CAROLINA PRACrIzc AND PROCEDURE §410 (1929);
1 MORDEcAI, LAw LEcrums 127 (2d ed. 1916).
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wife, and children. The net worth of each trust in each of the years
for which gift taxes were assessed was more than sufficient to provide
the margins required to cover the trading carried on for it. In a
prior case involving the same trusts, it was held that the income from
trading on margin realized by the trusts was taxable to the settlor as
this income was directly attributable to the voluntary exercise of his
personal skill in trading for the account of the trusts and constituted
a voluntary assignment of a portion of his personal earnings.' Held:
the net income derived from trading on behalf of the trusts accrued
immediately and directly to the trusts; respondent never owned or
held an economic interest in such income; and he could not withhold
any part thereof from the trusts. Hence the income did not represent
a taxable gift from the respondent.2
The interrelation of the income, estate and gift taxes, or the lack
of it, has claimed the attention of writers3 and of the courts.4  In
Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue5 the court remarked,
".. . without further aid from Congress it is perhaps impossible for
the courts to work out a complete integration of the three taxes." An
analysis of the cases will demonstrate the difficulties and confusion.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Prouty6 the taxpayer
had created three trusts. In 1935 she relinquished all reserved power
to revoke or amend the instruments and the Commissioner assessed
gift taxes at that time. The court found that in two of the trusts the
taxpayer's husband-beneficiary had no substantial adverse interest be-
fore the surrender of powers by the taxpayer and that gift taxes were
properly assessed in 1935. Finding a substantial adverse interest in
the third trust prior to the surrender of powers led the court to hold
that as to this trust the transfer was completed prior to the effective
date of the gift tax. The Commissioner contended that under the
Clifford7 rule the taxpayer remained in substance the owner of the
corpus and that the gift being regarded as incomplete for income tax
'Hogle "v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 132 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 10th
1942). This case contains a detailed account of the trusts and shows the first
trust had a liquidating value of slightly over $745,0)0 in 1940 and the second
trust $200,000 at the same time.
2Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352 (C. C. A. 10th
1947).
'Greenfield, Correlation of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 16 TEMPLE
L. Q. 194 (1942). Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate,
and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV.
L. R. 337 (1942). 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §17.03 et. seq.
(1942).
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A.
2d 1942), Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F. 2d 237 (C. C. A.
1st 1942).
129 F. 2d 237, 239 (C. C. A. 1st 1942).
8115 F. 2d 331 (C. C. A. 1st 1940).
' Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S.. 331 (1940).
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should be similarly regarded for purposes of the gift tax. The court
stated that it was far from clear that the Clifford rule applied but
that if it did the gift tax was not so closely integrated with the income
tax that taxing the income of a trust to the grantor would lead to the
conclusion that no gift tax was payable upon the creation of the trust.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Beck's Estate8 the tax-
payer transferred securities and insurance policies on his life to the
trustee. The income of the trust was to be used to pay premiums
on the insurance and at the taxpayer's death the proceeds of the pol-
icies were to become a part of the corpus. The taxpayer, in computing
the gift tax, deducted the capitalized value of the income necessary
to pay the premiums during his life expectancy on the theory that
this portion was not a gift as the income remained taxable to him by
virtue of Section 167 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court
held the taxpayer liable for the gift tax on the amount deducted. This
created a situation where the taxpayer was liable for the gift tax on
property because he transferred it away, and yet remained liable for
the income tax on the income of the same property.9
In Lockard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'0 the taxpayer
creAted an irrevocable short-term trust in 1938 and in 1939 transferred
additional property to the trust. In 1941 the taxpayer claimed the
fuill $40,000 exemption."1 The Commissioner disallowed a portion of
this exemption on the ground that the taxpayer had claimed an exemp-
tion on the gifts of 1938 and 1939. The taxpayer contended that,
is she was taxed on the income of the trusts under the Clifford rule,
no gifts were made until the income was distributed to her beneficiary.
The court dismissed this contention saying that the income tax and
the gift tax each had its own independent criteria and that for purposes
of the gift tax the transfers were complete in 1938 and 1939 and the
gift tax exemptions then claimed must stand.' 2
The rule of these cases seems to be that when under applicable law,
the legal title to income vests in one person when it arises, but under
federal revenue laws is taxed to another, there is no gift tax liability
when the incoime is paid over to the former. This doctrine would seem
to apply to family partnership of the Tower'3 or Lusthaus14 variety
8.129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
' See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §17.19 (1942) for a
criticism of the B. T. A. decision in favor of the taxpayer in the Beck case.10 166 F. 2d 409 (C. C. A. 1st 1948).
" INT. REv. CODE §1004 (exemption now $30,000).
12 In the Tax Court it was held that the transfers in trust were complete in
1938 and 1939 for gift tax purposes on the authority of Hogle v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 986 (1946) without a discussion of any difference
in the cases. Lockard v. Commissiofier of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 1151 (1946).
3 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
" Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Intetnal Revente, 327 U. S. 293 (1946).
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in that under partnership law1 5 the ownership of the income would be
in the donee while the donor remained taxable on the same income.
The income in the Hogle case was profits arising directly from the
personal activities of the settlor and the analogy to the partnership
cases is close.
The courts have determined that the "broad sweep" of Section 22
(a) does not require the penetration of the legal form of the trans-
action when incidence of the gift tax is the subject of the inquiry16
because the gift tax issue is ownership while the income tax issue
in trust cases is whether the settlor retained rights equivalent to
substantial ownership' 7 and in partnership case is whether the donor
earned the income.' s
The .Hogle case says that it represents a refusal to make an un-
justified extension of the Clifford doctrine,19 but does it? The gift
tax is imposed in the year in which the transfer is consummated 2 0
In the present case the real gifts appear to have come in the years for
which the Commissioner assessed the gift tax and to have been in-
complete before that time.21 At the time the trusts were created
they consisted of trading accounts and no property was transferred.22
The income sought to be made subject to the gift tax arose from the
personal efforts and skill of Hogle and not from the corpus of the
trust.23 The court appears to have indicated a method whereby a tax-
payer can transfer to his beneficiaries the fruit of his skill and labor
without the transfer being subject to either gift or estate taxes.2 4
In any event, the lack of forceful and convincing reasoning to support
the Hogle decision indicates the need for clarification either by Congress
or the Supreme Court.2 5
DONALD W. McCoy.
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §24.
"' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Prouiy, 115 F. 2d 331, 337 (C. C. A.
1st 1940) ; Lockard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 166 F. 2d 409,
C. C. A. 1st 1948). See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL. ESTATE AND GIr TAXATIONt §17.17
(1942).
"Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
"Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352, 352 (C. C. A.
10th 1948).210 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933).
"This is the theory on which the dissent in the tax court would have im-
posed the gift tax. Hogle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C.
986, 990 (1946).
2Hogle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T. C. 986, 987 (1947).
" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hogle, 165 F. 2d 352, 353 (C. C. A.
10th 1947).
" By setting up trading accounts in trust as was done in the Hogle case or
by the gift of a portion of a partnership to a member of the family. tCompare
the gift tax status of a salaried man who makes an assignment of unearned
future income. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §16.12 (1942).
" The government has indicated it will not appeal the Hogle case. CCH FED.
EST: & GIFT TAX REP. 9800 (1946).
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Unfair Competition-Secondary Meaning of Trade Names
in Cases of Dissimilar Products
Plaintiff is the publisher of "Seventeen," a magazine of fashions
and other interests for girls of high school age. It began publication
in August 1944 and had the name "Seventeen" registered in the patent
office as a tradename for "a monthly magazine devoted to the interests
of girls." Defendants are manufacturers of dresses for "teen-age"
girls, named and labeled "Seventeen for the Junior Teens." They
began to show samples to the trade in November 1944 but did not
make deliveries until May 1945. Plaintiff, in March 1945, brought an
action for infringement and unfair competition grounded on defend-
ant's use of the word "Seventeen" in their tradename and label. The
evidence showed that plaintiff's magazine had had a phenomenal suc-
cess from the time of its first publication; that in addition to the pub-
lication of the magazine the plaintiff also conducts a sales promotion
service designed to promote the sale of dresses which have been ad-
vertised in its magazine; that this service consists of expert advice
as to styles and salesmanship, as well as reprints, counter cards and
"blow-ups" of its advertisements for use in store displays; and that
the plaintiff also sells hang-tags for garments on sales racks, featuring
the words "You saw it in Seventeen." The evidence further showed
that the word "Seventeen," as used by the defendants in their label,
was given prominence over the words "for the Junior Teens"; and that
the defendants furnished dealers with hang-tags, such as the plaintiff
did, in which the word "Seventeen" was emphasized. The trial court
found that the defendants had deliberately chosen the word "Seven-
teen" with a knowledge of the good reputation that the plaintiff's
magazine had acquired and with the intention of taking unfair ad-
vantage of its reputation and good will; that persons in the apparel
business had been confused by the defendant's tradename into think-
ing that there was some relation or connection between their dresses
and the plaintiff's magazine; and that the confusion was likely to
continue.' From a judgment granting injunctive relief the defendants
appealed. Held: Although there was no technical infringement of
the plaintiff's statutory registration, since the defendant's merchandise
was not "of substantially the same descriptive properties" as that regis-
tered by the plaintiff, that the use of the name of the magazine in a
service for commercially blessing and obliquely branding the mer-
chandise of others endowed the tradename "Seventeen" with a sec-
ondary meaning which is entitled to protection.2
The development of the law of unfair competition is of cqmpara-
'Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Hanson, 65 F. Supp. 952 (E. D. Mo. 1946).
-Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Hanson, 163 F. 2d 74 (C. C. A. 8th 1947).
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tively recent origin.3 A trader's protection in the use of his trade-
name is but a part of the broader field of unfair competition, 4 the
general purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing off
his goods or services as the goods or services of another. 5 The early
cases were based solely upon the fraudulent use of technical tradenames
or marks and thus .protection was narrowly confined by the defense that
the names in question did not comply with the common law require-
ments.6 To be valid under the rules of the common law a technical
tradename must be fanciful and arbitrary, and not merely generic
or descriptive of the goods or their quality;7 nor may it be merely
geographical. 8 It cannot be obtained in the form, appearance, or finish
of one's.goods, nor in the mere size or shape or mode of construction
of a container. 9 It cannot be a personal name;1O and whatever the
name it must be affixed to the goods in connection with which it is
used.1 Obviously, with the growth of commerce and the attendant
growth in advertising and other methods of creating good will there
is found the use of numerous names not worthy of protection as a
technical tradename because not complying with some of the require-
ments set out above. It was through the efforts of the courts to
avoid these hardships in protecting reputation and to halt dishonesty
in the trade, even in the absence of an infringement of a technical
tradename, that the doctrine of "secondary meaning" came into being.'2
The doctrine may be generally stated as meaning that words or sym-
bols used in connection with one's goods, services, or business, or the
physical attributes of one's goods, which for some reason or other, are
not capable of exclusive appropriation as a technical tradename, may
nevertheless be protected against simulation when they have acquired
a secondary meaning,-3 differing from their primary meaning, that
is, when they have become associated in the mind of the public as
'As late as 1742, Lord Hardwicke in denying relief stated that he "knew of
no instance of restraining one trader from making use of the same mark with
another." Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742), quoted in Note, 38 Hv. L.
REv. 370 (1924).
' Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
' fJnited Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918).
'Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Alien and Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513 (C.C.A.
7th 1913); aff'd. 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
Elgin National Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665 (1901).
Also see 26 R.C.L. 847.
'La Republic Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs Co., 107 Fed. 459, 461
(C.C.A. 2d 1901).
'Up-John Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921).
"Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 (1914).
'.XDiederich v. Schneider Wholesale Wine Co., 195 Fed. 35 (C.C.A. 8th
191?)?. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 6th 1912).
as bid.
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identifying the source or origin of goods, rather than the goods
themselves.14
The test to be applied is whether the name has become broadly
known to the public as denoting a product of certain origin.Y5 It is
essential that the secondary meaning claimed be indicative of origin
and not merely descriptive of the process of manufacture,' 0 or of the
functional features17 of the goods or services.' 8 The plaintiff has
the burden of showing that the disputed name has acquired a secondary
meaning,'9 and that the defendant has unfairly used it, or a simulation
thereof, to the prejudice of the plaintiff's interests. 20
Since a trader's right grows out of the use of the tradename he
has chosen and not its mere adoption,21 to state a cause of action
the plaintiff must show his exclusive use and the establishrient of a
secondary meaning prior to the time of the defendant's use.2 2 In
establishing the fact of identity of origin in the public consciousness
the plaintiff may present testimony of members of the purchasing pub-
lic,2 3 or of retailers or salesmen.24 But the view of the general pur-
chasing public is controlling, 25 inasmuch as the test, as pointed out
above,26 is the reaction of the general public. Evidence of expendi-
tures in advertising a name used in connection with a trader's goods,
services, or business, while not conclusive, is an important factor in
determining the existence of a secondary meaning.27 The same is
true of showing a large volume of sales.28 Not only must the plaintiff
"Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S.
315 (1938).
" .Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924). See Notes, 40 A.L.R.
424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
'- Rubber and C. Harness Trimming Co. v. F. W. Devoe and C. T. Reynolds
Co., 233 Fed. 150 (N. J. 1916).
,"'Functional features" in unfair competition cases means those which, in
an engineering sense, are necessary to the construction of an article. Lektro-
Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92 F. 2d 435 (C.C.A. 2d 1937).
18 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (C.C.A. 2d
1918). Also see Note, 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
"
9 Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed. 657 (C.C.A.
6th 1916).
"McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F. 2d 293r
296 (App. D. C. 1940).
"Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
"Up-John Co. v. Wm. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921). Also see Sterling Products Corp. v.
Sterling Products, 45 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
"Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
"Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
" Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
" Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924). See Notes, 40
A.L.R. 424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
" Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (Conn.
1935).
8 Up-John Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921).
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show the establishment of identity of origin2 9 but he must also show
the resulting confusion in the minds of dealers and the purchasing
public caused by the defendant's simulation of the plaintiff's trade-
name.3 0 This too may be proved by testimony of members of the
purchasing public3 ' and by that of dealers.32 Some courts have held
that as a condition to granting relief a fraudulent intent must be
proved.83 But, since the injury to the plaintiff is the same regardless
of intent, the better view is that intent is immaterial.3 4
The early secondary meaning cases expressed the strict view of
unfair competition. Not only did the parties have to be competing
in the same territory, but they had to sell the same article.35 This may
be explained by the fact that the earlier cases demanding relief under
the theory of unfair competition were all simple cases of one trader
passing off his good as those of a rival.30 Since all of these early de-
cisions turned solely on the "passing off" by the defendant, the courts
later on could find but little authority for enjoining the acts of a
defendant who was not, strictly speaking, a competitor of the plain-
tiff.87 However the history of tradename litigation shows that the
use of similar names in non-competing fields has become the normal
rather than the exceptional case of infringement.38 In recognition of
this development the courts began to extend their protection to cases
involving dissimilar, non-competing products if it could be shown that
they were "related."3 9 Under the "relation" doctrine protection was
extended in cases involving pancake flour and syrup,40 baking powder
and baking soda,41 washing powder and sweeping powder,42 men's
suits and men's hats,43 cooking pans and wash boilers,44 beer and
"Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924); See Notes, 40 A.L.R.
424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
"Zangerle & P. Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 266
(C.C.A. 7th 1934).
"1Steem-Electric Corp. v. -erzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
1" Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
"United Lace and Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co., 221 Fed. 456 (E.D.
N.Y. 1915).
"American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F. 2d 488 (E.D.
Mich. 1930); Trappey v. McIlhenny Co., 281 Fed. 23 (C.C.A. 5th 1922), cert.
denied, 260 U. S. 733 (1922), modified, 12 F. 2d 19 (C.C.A. 5th 1926), cert.
denied, 273 U. S. 699 (1926).
" Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510(C.C.A. 7th 1912).
"NIms, UNFAIR COmPFTiTIoN 4 (2d ed. 1919).
"' See Note, 38 HARv. L. Rav. 370 (1924) and authorities there cited.
"8 Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAav. L. Rs-v.
813, 825 (1927).
" Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C.C.A. 2d 1917).
40 Ibid.
"'Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church and Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35 (C.C.A.
8th 1910).
'Van Zile v. Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1916).
"Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliot, 7 F. 2d 962 (C.C.A. 3d 1925).
"Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Sargoy Bros. and Co., 276 Fed. 447(E.D.N.Y. 1921).
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-malt syrup,4 5 automobiles and tires,4 6 cut tobacco and cigarettes,4 7
toilet soap and shaving soap,4 8 pianos and phonographs,4 9 toilet brushes
and toothbrushes, 50 flour and bread, 5 ' automobiles and radio tubes.5 2
The cases cited established beyond controversy that the products
need not be the same in order for relief to be granted, and that there
need be neither confusion in the narrow sense that one article would
be mistaken for the other, nor competition in the sense that the con-
sumer's need for the one would be fulfilled by his purchase of the
other.53 In applying the relationship doctrine to grant relief where
the products were dissimilar the courts were but a step away from
granting relief even in the absence of a relationship if there Was ac-
tually unfair competition. The fact that at this stage the tendency
of the courts was to emphasize the word "unfair" rather than "com-
petition"5 4 made that step an easy one to take. Today, relief will be
granted if it be shown that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trade-
name creates in the public mind the impression of some "connection"
existing between the parties,5 5 and/or simply that there is a likelihood
that the public will be confused as to the idetity of the maker of the
defendant's product. 56 The result is certainly consistent with the test
to determine secondary meaning, as set out above, 5 7 as well as with the
"'Anheuser Busch v. Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 287 Fed. 243 (S.D.
N.Y. 1921).
" Willys-Overland Co. v. Akron-Overland Tire Co., 268 Fed. 151 (Del. 1920),
aff'd, 273 Fed. 674 (C.C.A. 3d 1921).
'47 American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 170 Fed. 117 (C.C.S.D.Y. 1909).
' Waltke and Co. v. Schafer and Co., 263 Fed. 650 (App. D. C. 1920).
"Wilcox and White Co. v. Leiser, 276 Fed. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
"Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd and Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C.C.A. 2d 1910).
" Potter-Wrightington, Inc. v. Ward Baking Co., 288 Fed. 597 (Mass. 1923),
aff'd 298 Fed. 398 (C.C.A. 1st 1924).
"Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. 2d 272 (C.C.A. 2d 1934), Though
the result of this case is certainly the correct one the reasoning of the court has
been subjected to much criticism. See Lukens, The Application of the Principles
of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. oF PA. L. REv.
197, 203 (1927) where it is said, "A layman reading the facts of the Rolls-Royce
case-would instantly say that the defendant's act was unfair. A court comes
to the same conclusion as quickly, but to justify its conclusion must employ
the far-fetched reasoning that automobiles and radio tubes are related because
they both involve the use of electricity, which would lead with equal logic to the
conclusion that submarines and pocket flashlights are related products. It is
much more certain that the use of the name Rolls-Royce for radio tubes is
unfair than that radio tubes and automobiles are related products.
3 Id. at 200.
' Oates, Relief in Equity against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-competi-
tors, 25 ILu. L. REv. 643, 645 (1931).
" Tiffany and Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (1932), aff'd 237 App. Div. 801 (1932), aff'd 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30
(1933).
"Wolff, Non-competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37 CoL. L. REv. 582
(1937).
"'See note 15 supra. Also see Vick Chemical Co. v. Vick Medicine Co.,
8 F. 2d 49 (S.D. Ga. 1925).
At the same time the courts relaxed the strict territorial requirements and
in order to forestall any possibility of injury to the plaintiff began to grant re-
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fundamental principle of the law of unfair competition, viz., that a
man's continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good will
flowing therefrom should be protected.5 8 Under the modem, liberal
view injunctive relief has been granted in cases concerning such dis-
similar and unrelated products as jewelry and motion pictures,5 9
drugs and cigars, 60 pipes and shirts,6 ' food and radios,62 fountain pens
and razor blades,68 mineral oil and figs, 64 food and a cleaning and dye-
ing business,65 and locks and flashlights.66 Even more directly in
point with the subject case is Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 7
and Esquire,* Inc. v. Esquire Bar.68 In the Vogue case the publisher
of "Vogue," a ladies' fashion magazine, was held entitled to restrain
the use of its tradename as a label on defendant's hats. In the Esquire
case, the publisher of "Esquire," a gentlemen's fashion magazine, was
held entitled to injunctive relief from the use of its tradename as
the name for defendant's bar. In both cases the element of real com-
petition was lacking for obviously the publisher of "Vogue" could
not lose the sale of a hat to the defendant, nor could the publisher of
"Esquire" lose the sale of a highball. But, in both cases, a secondary
meaning having been established, the plaintiffs stood to lose an interest
equally as valuable, namely, the link, even though possibly anonymous,
between themselves and their consumers, which has been established
through their ingenuity and the merits of their wares or services. 9 As
has been indicated by an eminent writer in the field,70 since the func-
tion of a tradename is to bring to the public mind the article of the
maker, any conduct or use of the name which makes it less unique
lief under a theory which seems to include territory coextensive with the plain-
tiff's reputation regardless of whether the plaintiff engages in user in such
territory. Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co., 22 F. 2d 721 (C.C.A. 5th 1927);
Terminal Barber Shops v. Zoberg, 28 F. 2d 807 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); Vogue Co.
v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 6th 1924) ; Wall v. Rolls-Royce
of America, 4 F. _d 333 (C.C.A. 3d 1925).
"
8Elgin National Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665 (1901);
Merriam v.'Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 6th 1912). See Nims, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 389.
" Tiffany and Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (1932), aff'd 237 App. Div. 801 (1932), aff'd 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30
(1933).
"' Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C.C.A. 6th 1917).
"'Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1929).
"
2Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 703 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
'L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
" Standard Oil Co. v. California Peach and Fig Growers, 28 F. 2d 283 (Del.
1928).
"' Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Cleaners and Dyers, 10 F.
Supp. 450 (W. D. Pa. 1934).
" Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972 (C.C.A. 2d 1928).
67300 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 6th 1924).
'37 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. Fla. 1941).
Ce Schechter, supra note 38 at 833.
"Old at 813.
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and distinctive lessens to that extent the likelihood of its suggesting
the article so named to the public conscience. As such a reduction in
distinctiveness is harmful whether the name be used on a related or
entirely different product, equity should prevent such use or else the
name will ultimately become entirely colorless. It is this gradual whit-
tling away of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the plain-
tiff's tradename, and the resultant dilution of its selling powers, by
constant use in connection with non-competing goods, that the court
is attempting to prohibit in the Vogue and Esquire cases. 71 The court's
objective was the same in the subject case where it was greatly aided by
the additional competitive situation created by the plaintiff's sales pro-
motion program for dresses which had been advertised in its magazine.
The result of a contrary rule would be a failure of the law to cope
with the constantly developing ingenuity of the trade parasite.7 2 Dur-
ing the days of the early development of the law of unfair competition
the methods of merchandising articles of commerce were such that
comparatively little, if any, damage would follow the appropriatidn of
a tradename, even in a primary sense, by a non-competitor. 73  Today,
when millions are spent annually in national advertising to create and
maintain far reaching reputation in a tradename, the courts are pre-
sented with an entirely different problem which taxes the adaptability
of the old rules, too often narrowly expressed. The problem can be
satisfactorily met only by keeping the principles of the law of unfair
competition elastic by tempering them with "good conscience" and
"judicial sensibilities" in their application.
JoHN RiCHARD JOPDAN, JR.
"'Note, 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 444, 446 (1938).
""See Rogers, The Ingenuity of the Infringer and the Courts, 11 Mica. L.
Ray. 358 (1913).
'* Oates, supra note 54 at 644.
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